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The Duty of Responsible Administration and the

Problem of Police Accountability
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simont
Many contemporarycivil rights claims arisefrom institutionalactivity that,
while troubling,is neither malicious nor egregiously reckless. When lawmakers
find themselves unable to produce substantive rulesfor such activity, they often
turn to regulating the actors' exercise of discretion. The consequence is an
emerging duty of responsible administrationthat requires managers to actively
assess the effects of their conduct on civil rights values and make reasonable
efforts to mitigate harm to protectedgroups. This doctrinalevolution partially
but imperfectly converges with an increasingemphasis in public administration
on the need to reassess routines in the light of changing circumstances. We
illustratethe doctrinal and administrative changes with a study of policing. We
discuss court-supervised reforms in New York and Cincinnati as examples of
contrasting trajectories that these developments can take. Both initiatives are
better understoodin terms of an implicit duty ofresponsibleadministrationthan
as an expression of any particularsubstantiveright. The Cincinnatiintervention,
however, reaches more deeply into core administrativepractices and indeed
mandates a particular crime control strategy: Problem-Oriented Policing
(POP).As such, it typifies a more ambitious type ofstructural intervention that
parallels comprehensive civil rights initiatives in other areas.
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I. Introduction
Public officials have a duty of responsible administration that consists of
three elements. It requires that officials articulate reflectively the policies and
principles that govern their work. It demands that they monitor the activities of
peers and subordinates to induce compliance with these policies and principles.
And finally, the duty mandates frequent reassessment of these policies and
principles in light of the officials' own experience and that of comparable
institutions.
The "duty of responsible administration" is our name for some converging
trends in constitutional law, common law, and statutes. The term usefully
connotes developments across a range of fields. It resonates with interpretations
of the constitutional Due Process and Take Care Clauses that entail obligations
of general proactive administration.' However, the most important recent
authority for the duty arises from efforts to elaborate provisions of substantive
civil rights law. Where courts or legislatures cannot mandate specific substantive
directives, they often turn to regulating the ways officials give content to their
discretion. Recurring procedural themes in the elaboration of various substantive
doctrines suggest a set of implicit overarching norms. In a reversal of a process

1.
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974) (suggesting that "due process" entails general proactive
administrative duties); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836,
1875-86 (2015) (considering the Take Care Clause of Article 11 as a source of a duty to supervise
subordinate officials).
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noted by Henry Maine, procedure has been secreted in the interstices of
substance. 2
At the same time doctrine is becoming more procedural, administrative
processes are evolving. Agencies have been moving away from bureaucratic
forms of administration. Bureaucracy, as understood in mid-twentieth century
America, was a balance of stable, hierarchically promulgated rules and lightly
supervised discretion. Yet, this kind of organization no longer seems appropriate
for many contemporary problems. Addressing current problems requires both
more flexibility than rules permit and more transparency than discretion typically
affords. Efficacy depends on frontline initiative but also demands that such
initiative be reflective and accountable. Thus, administration is drawn to postbureaucratic forms of organization that emphasize provisional and easily revised
plans, monitoring designed to induce learning as well as compliance, and
systematic reassessment on the basis of experience within the agency and in
comparable institutions.
These developments in civil rights doctrine and in public administration
originated independently of each other, but they now converge strongly. Secondgeneration doctrine turns substantially on notions of reasonableness, and
reasonableness tends to be assessed in terms of accepted patterns of
administrative practice. Moreover, where administration is bureaucratic, courts
must either intervene by imposing rules, which would often inefficiently rigidify
administration, or defer to unaccountable discretion, which would often leave
lawless practice unremedied. Post-bureaucratic administration makes possible
responses that do not carry the disadvantages of either of these courses of action.
We illustrate these developments by a discussion of civil rights law,
especially as it relates to policing. Scholars have noted the administrative turn in
civil rights doctrine. 3 The classic Warren and Burger Court era cases have proven
inadequate to address many "second-generation" problems. First-generation
problems typically involved intentionally harmful or egregiously irresponsible
conduct. Classic doctrine often defined liability in terms of individualistic
psychological notions such as "discriminatory intent" or "deliberate
indifference" and prescribed remedies in the form of bureaucratic-type rules. By
contrast, second-generation cases often arise from unreflective or normatively
ambiguous conduct that, although troubling, does not fit the psychological
premises of classic doctrine. Legislators, judges, and regulators often find that

2.

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883)

("in the infancy of Courts of Justice,.. substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in
the interstices of procedure").
3.

See generally,Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn in AntidiscriminationLaw,

94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (2007);
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism,91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of
Interpretationand Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1285-91 (2012); Susan Sturm, Second
GenerationEmployment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
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they cannot confidently promulgate or apply substantive rules to remedy
problems that generate such claims. Thus, they have been drawn to an alternative
approach: lawmakers can require the institutional actors to assess their own
conduct, then appraise the adequacy of this self-assessment. This regulatory
approach has an affinity with the core techniques of post-bureaucratic
organization, which are designed to reduce the behavioral unreflectiveness and
normative ambiguity that create problems for classic civil rights doctrine. Classic
civil rights doctrine tends to treat managerial inquiry and control as prerequisites
for responsibility; the emerging duty treats them as entailments of responsibility.
The reform of policing exemplifies this evolution. Post-bureaucratic
transformation came late to policing, but its manifestations are now pervasive.
Courts have been a major influence. This influence has not been transmitted
primarily through declarations of substantive rights enforced through the
exclusionary rule or damage actions. The most important avenue of judicial
influence in recent years has instead been structural reform. In many cases where
a private plaintiff or the Department of Justice has alleged recurring civil rights
violations, intervention has focused on changes in administrative processes.
Appellate authority, however, remains conflicted about such intervention, as
some judges urge deference to administrative discretion for fear that structural
relief would rigidify administration. In doing so, they often appear to assume
mistakenly that such intervention would have to take bureaucratic forms.
Although the trend toward post-bureaucratic reform is clear, we note two
ambiguities. First, post-bureaucratic policing can take different organizational
forms. In particular, alternatives vary in the extent to which they emphasize
innovation and decentralization. Second, judicial remedies differ in the extent to
which they focus on specialized procedures for civil rights compliance, as
opposed to broader reforms that reach into the agencies' core activities.
We illustrate the contrasting trajectories reform might take through a
comparison of New York, where a federal district court held policing practices
unlawful in 2013, and Cincinnati, which settled a civil rights challenge to
policing practices in 2002. Both examples manifest the structural turn. They owe
more to an implicit duty of responsible administration than to any particular
substantive norm. They tend to mandate the key elements of post-bureaucratic
administration-explicit but provisional policy-setting on matters previously left
to tacit discretion, monitoring, and reassessment in light of experience and
evidence.
However, the two regimes embody the opposing poles of post-bureaucratic
policing. New York's, sometimes called Assertive Policing (AP), focuses on
rapid deployment of personnel to implement a limited set of standard solutions,
especially street confrontations and minor-offense enforcement. By contrast,
Cincinnati has adopted an approach called Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) that
emphasizes varied, innovative, and localized responses, often developed in
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collaboration with stakeholders. It thus typifies a form of public initiative known
as democratic experimentalism. 4
The two cities also reflect different approaches to judicial remediation. The
New York intervention emphasizes specialized procedures designed to constrain
civil rights violations. Cincinnati's intervention, on the other hand, required
comprehensive reform of the city's policing practices, in particular, the adoption
of POP. The scope of the Cincinnati intervention is unique among judiciallyinduced resolutions in policing cases. Some provisions that appear increasingly
in settlements, however, blur the distinction between specialized and systemic
reform by requiring reassessment of crime-control tactics associated with
recurrent civil rights violations. The more ambitious of these reforms resemble
holistic civil rights interventions in other areas, including labor standards,
education, and child welfare.
In Part II, we show that the changing nature of civil rights claims has pushed
doctrine to focus on administration, but that the move has been intermittent and
incomplete. In Part II1, we discuss the evolution of policing. We show that
policing has evolved beyond the bureaucratic forms assumed by classic civil
rights doctrine, but that this evolution involves multiple trajectories with
potentially different implications for civil rights enforcement. In Part IV, we
contrast the conventional, judicially-supervised reform in New York with the
more ambitious initiative in Cincinnati and suggest some advantages of the latter.
Existing research does not establish the superiority of either model (in part
because it often fails to distinguish them). Yet the Cincinnati approach has
potential advantages for both crime control and civil rights that warrant
experimentation and research. In particular, it appears less prone than the New
York approach to antagonize and deter cooperation from minority communities
and better able to take account of the costs of indiscriminate criminalization of
nonviolent disorderly conduct.
11. The Evolution of Civil Rights Doctrine
Confronted by new problems that resist substantive regulation, civil rights
doctrine has increasingly addressed administration. It has imposed duties that
require defendants to clarify and assess rigorously their own interpretations of
the norms that govern them. The trend, however, has been halting, and doctrine
sometimes perpetuates older premises about organization that are, in important
respects, anachronistic.

4.
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998).
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A. The OrganizationalPremisesof ClassicDoctrine
Classic doctrine drew on two models from the past. The first, which dates
from the early years of the republic, sees public officials as autonomous actors
5
exercising broad discretion within fairly clear, judicially elaborated constraints.
The second, which dates from the Progressive and New Deal eras, sees them as
bureaucrats exercising low-visibility discretion in the interstices of webs of
hierarchically promulgated rules.6
Doctrine often simply ignored the organizational context of government
and treated officials as lone individuals. When it did recognize public
organization, it tended to ignore managerial action other than making or
following rules, and it more or less explicitly disregarded managerial inaction.
When deciding whether to intervene, the courts sometimes acted or spoke as if
their intervention would necessarily take a quasi-bureaucratic, rule-based form.
They treated the decision to intervene as a choice between the judicial imposition
of rules or deference to administrative discretion, and often decided to hold back
for fear of excessively cramping discretion.
The tendency to see government as operating either through independent
individual action or bureaucracy is salient in the two core substantive civil rights
doctrines that address frontline policing-antidiscrimination and search and
seizure. It can also be seen in procedural doctrine on injunctive relief and on
attribution of frontline conduct to agencies or senior managers.
1. Antidiscrimination.
The premise of the autonomous official is most salient in antidiscrimination
doctrine. Liability turns here on "intent" to discriminate. Application of the idea
was fairly straightforward when lawsuits challenged rules that explicitly
distinguished among races or genders or practices that officials discussed in
explicitly racist or sexist terms. However, partly as a result of the success of past
litigation, explicitly racist or sexist rules and official discourse have virtually
disappeared from public life. "Second-generation" challenges typically address
decisions or practices that are not facially discriminatory but that foreseeably or
demonstrably harm protected groups disproportionately. If an employer makes
hiring decisions under legitimate but vague standards like "diligent" and
"resourceful," bias may not be evident in any one decision. If the overall pattern
disfavors a protected group, however, suspicion arises. An employer's use of a
specific rule, like a high school graduation requirement, also generates concern

5.
JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 65-78 (2012).
6.
William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Low, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 67-79 (2015). On the idea of bureaucracy as a combination of rigid rules and lowvisibility discretion, see MICHEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964), and ALVIN W.
GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY (1954).
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where the rule, though facially neutral, disqualifies more black than white
candidates.
However, discriminatory intent is more elusive in a world of tacit
discrimination. Even when the challenged action is motivated by group-based
animus, it may be hard to prove the animus when the defendant's agents take
care to hide it. More fundamentally, once we get beyond overt prejudice, it is
hard to define, much less discover, intent. The Supreme Court says that the
challenged decision must have been made "because of, not merely in spite of'
the harm it inflicts on a protected group. 7 This seems ambiguous or seriously
under-inclusive. In organizations, harmful conduct may often lack purpose and
reflection. It can arise from "selective indifference," cognitive stereotyping, or
inertial perpetuation of routine. 8 In such cases, what is objectionable is precisely
the actor's inattentiveness to the harm.
Doctrine has responded by allowing plaintiffs to support their cases with
evidence of disparate outcomes or effects. 9 If hiring decisions under general
standards disproportionately disfavor women or the high school diploma
requirement disproportionately disadvantages blacks, the courts sometimes
recognize a rebuttable inference of discrimination. The inference has to be
rebuttable because there are possible legitimate explanations for the disparities.
Perhaps high school graduation reliably predicts better job performance. The key
question is the strength of the burden of rebuttal. If a facially non-frivolous
recitation of a legitimate purpose is enough, much unfairness will not be
redressed. On the other hand, requiring the defendant to produce rigorous
scientific validation for its decisions may generate overbroad liability because
such validation is either prohibitively expensive or inconclusive.
The courts have been especially sensitive to the dangers of constraining
legitimate practice through excessive liability in the criminal justice context. In
declining to entertain a challenge to sentencing practices based on exceptionally
rigorous disparate impact evidence, the Supreme Court said in McCleskey v.
Kemp that giving weight to such evidence "throws ... into serious question the

Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). See generally Sturm,
7.
supra note 3, and Johnson, supra note 3.
8.
JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT (1922) (on inertial perpetuation of

routine); Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14 (1976) (on
"selective indifference"); Linda Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (on cognitive
stereotyping). On the general problem of "racism without racists," see RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE
RACE CARD 37-92 (2008).
9.

Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of DisparateImpact Discrimination,59 FORDHAM L.

REV. 523, 581-91 (1991). Disparate impact liability has been explicitly recognized under Titles VI (federal
grantees) and VII (employers) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII (housing marketers) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Texas Dep't of Hous. and
Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2516-19 (2015); Johnson, supra
note 3, at 386-401.
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principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system."' Such deference,
however, leaves less overt or visible forms of abuse immune from accountability.
2. Search and Seizure.
The second view of organizational liability in classic doctrine-the view
premised upon the twentieth-century bureaucratic model-is salient in search
and seizure doctrine. This doctrine rejects the subjective "intent" focus of
antidiscrimination. Instead, its touchstone is "objective reasonableness." ' "I One
might have thought that this perspective would lead in policing, as it did in
common law professional negligence, to broad supervision under norms derived
from professional culture and practice. Fourth Amendment reasonableness,
however, differs from the common law duty of care in negligence actions. It is a
set of more or less specific norms promulgated by the courts (or occasionally,
legislatures) on the basis of an ostensibly utilitarian calculus. 2
The courts insist that these norms take the form of "readily administrable
rules." They emphasize that Fourth Amendment norms have to be "applied on
the spur of (and in the heat of) the moment" and thus cannot contain too many
"ifs, ands, or buts." 3 Indeed, even as the courts try to make the rules as simple
as possible, they do not hold officers accountable for unlawful practices unless
the courts' prior pronouncements unambiguously cover the situation at hand.
Thus, the "qualified immunity" doctrine provides that liability for unreasonable
searches and seizures can only be imposed where the action violates a "clearly
established" duty. 14
In effect, the courts treat frontline officers like low-level bureaucrats. And
they cast themselves in the role of bureaucratic rulemaker. At the same time, they
recognize the importance of broad frontline discretion, which they sometimes
treat as effectively unregulatable. When a court finds that the plaintiffs' claim
cannot be formulated as an administrable substantive rule, it dismisses the
claim.' 5

10.
481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987). See also id. at 282 ("Because discretion is essential to
the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that
discretion has been abused .... ").
11.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
12.

John Rappaport, Second Order Regulation ofLaw Enforcement, 103 CAL. L. REV.

205, 215-17 (2015) (reviewing Fourth Amendment and other cases in which courts have imposed specified
conduct rules on law enforcement).
13.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).

14.
Brosseau v. Haugent, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that officers
are not liable for "constitutionally deficient conduct" unless the deficiency was "clearly established" in a
"particularized sense" relating to the circumstances ofthe officer's challenged act). Some cases even take
the view that only judicial authority within the circuit where the conduct occurred can clearly establish a
duty. E.g., Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003). But other cases
disagree. E.g., Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267,279-80 (4th Cir. 2004).
15.

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350 (stating as ground for rejection that "plaintiff's proposed

rule... promise[s] very little in the way ofadministrability").
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3. Attribution Under Section 1983.
Both autonomous-individual and rule-based perspectives underlie doctrine
on the attribution of frontline conduct to public institutions. Individualism is
salient in the practice of naming individual officers as defendants and,
sometimes, only individual officers. Naming individual officers is partly a
formalistic evasion of the traditional sovereign immunity of the federal
government and the states. But even where doctrine permits suing the
government by name-for example, in the case of municipalities-plaintiffs
purport to seek relief against individuals, despite the fact that the officers are
virtually always indemnified for liability.
With both public entity and senior officer defendants, the question arises
when such defendants are accountable for the wrongdoing of frontline officers.
§
The Supreme Court has dealt with this question extensively under 42 U.S.C. 16
1983-the procedural vehicle for most civil rights suits against state officials.
Early in the development of 1983 doctrine, the courts rejected importing the
private law principle of respondeat superior. Doing so would have made public
agencies (or their heads) in effect strictly liable for most wrongful subordinate
conduct intended to advance the agencies' public purposes. Respondeat superior
seemed to risk too much judicial intrusion. The courts could have responded to
this problem by predicating entity or employer liability on a showing of
irresponsible-that is, negligent or reckless-mismanagement or failure to
manage subordinates. Instead, at least initially, they demanded a showing that
the agent's conduct was, in some sense, "authorized." The conventional form of
authorization was a "policy," which was most readily demonstrated by a
hierarchically promulgated rule.1 7 In the landmark Monell case, the Supreme
Court rejected the claim that the "mere right to control without any direction or
control having been exercised" was sufficient.' 8
4. Structural Relief.
Finally, organizational premises surfaced in the ambivalence toward
structural relief in classic doctrine. The presumptive forms of relief for police
wrongdoing were motions to suppress illegally seized evidence and damage
judgments. Both procedures had well-recognized limits. Suppression was only
available in the small fraction of police-citizen encounters that resulted in the
filing of charges. Damage actions required large investments of energy and
resources. When these remedies did prove effective for complainants, they often

16.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing for a cause of action against anyone who,
"under color of' state law, causes a deprivation of a federal right).
17.

HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND

PRACTICE 193-201 (2d ed. 2004).
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978) (citing Rizzo v.
18.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)).
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involved what seemed to be excessive public costs, especially where suppression
thwarted otherwise valid prosecutions. Moreover, responsibility for challenged
conduct was usually diffuse and ambiguous, and officers almost never bore
liability costs personally. Neither procedure, therefore, had demonstrably strong
deterrent effects. Nevertheless, these remedies made sense from the perspective
of bureaucratic organization. Bureaucracies acted systemically through rules. If
a rule was bad, declaratory judicial relief could correct it. Individual frontline
wrongdoing, however, was assumed to be idiosyncratic.' 9 Case-by-case
remediation of the sort provided by suppression motions or damage actions was
20
well designed to correct idiosyncratic error.
Of course, the courts in the classic era recognized some situations where
reactive and individualized intervention was plainly inadequate. Beginning with
schools and moving to other public institutions, they developed the structural
injunction. This form of relief became highly controversial, and the appellate
courts became ambivalent about its use. They never repudiated it, but they issued
various cautions to the lower courts. For reasons of respect for other levels or
branches of government or of relative expertise, appellate doctrine has portrayed
structural intervention as a last resort. The strictures have been especially severe
with respect to policing, the subject of two landmark cases disapproving
structural challenges.
In Rizzo v. Goode, the Supreme Court reversed an order mandating that the
Philadelphia police adopt a complaint process consistent with "generally
recognized minimum standards."21 The original order was based on evidence of
sixteen incidents of frontline misconduct over the course of a year. The court
noted that there is no independent "right" to an adequate complaint process. It
ruled that the evidence of instances of misconduct did not suffice for systemic
relief where the conduct was not authorized by departmental policy and senior
22
officials "played no affirmative part" in it.
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court reversed an order enjoining the
use of "chokeholds" in certain circumstances and mandating training programs
and record-keeping to insure compliance with the prohibition. 23 There was no
dispute in Lyons that at least some of the challenged conduct was systemic
because it was authorized by department policy. But the Court reversed for lack
of standing. The lone plaintiff, it held, could not assert the threat of "real and
immediate" injury based on a single past encounter in which he had been

19.
See JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: THE
STORY OF LEAN PRODUCTION 57 (1990) ("In [bureaucratic] plants, problems tended to be treated as
random events. The idea was simply to repair each error and hope that it didn't recur.").
20.
See generally William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 780, 818-30 (2006).
21.

Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370.

22.
23.

Id. at 377.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 100, 102 (1983).
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improperly subjected to a chokehold. 24 The Court emphasized that the possibility
that he would be subjected to it again appeared small and speculative. The Court
has not always refused to recognize standing on the basis of a small probability
of official injury.25 The case therefore seems to reflect, in part, deference to
police discretion.
The underlying premise of much classical doctrine is that managerial
inquiry and control are prerequisites of duty rather than entailments of it.
Although the premise is pervasive, it is hard to find an explicit defense of it. It
appears to rest on an assumption that organizations take the form of a classical
bureaucracy in which senior officers influence conduct only by commanding it
through rules. It follows that they are not responsible for conduct they have not
mandated by rule (i.e., "authorized"). Perhaps the courts also believe that there
of responsible
are no standards by which they could define affirmative duties
26
law.
substantive
of
commands
the
from
apart
administration

The doctrine thus ignores that organizations in recent decades have been
less prone to take bureaucratic forms. Moreover, even when organizations are
formally bureaucracies, it is well recognized that senior managers influence
frontline practice in ways other than through promulgating rules. They can
selectively fail to enforce rules. They can make resources available for some
practices and not others, or they can measure and reward some conduct while
ignoring other conduct. Indeed, to limit accountability of senior officials to
violations they know about and/or authorize is to leave doctrine powerless
against one of the most characteristic pathologies of modem organizationsstrategically selective knowledge and attention. Managers monitor and enforce
the goals they care about, while ignoring how their subordinates achieve their
performance levels. Corporate executives can set and reward large sales targets
without paying attention to frauds or kickbacks. Likewise, police executives can
set and reward targets for stops and arrests without paying attention to Fourth
Amendment violations. Managers may feel they are worse off if they have
knowledge about compliance with norms that impede their primary goals.
' '27
Ignorance gives them "deniability.
at 102.
24.
Id.
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 130 S.Ct.1 138, 1155-65 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
25.
dissenting) (discussing several cases allowing standing on the basis of speculative prospect of injury from
official action and arguing that they are indistinguishable from the instant case in which the majority
denied standing, citing Lyons, to a challenge to national security surveillance practices).
26.
Even in the private sphere, the duty of corporate managers to manage proactively
was not clearly recognized until the 1990s. See In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,96970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
See, e.g., Craig Haney & Donald Specter, Treatment Rights in Uncertain Times, in
27.
TREATING ADULT AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS WITH SPECIAL NEEDS 51, 70 (Joseph B. Ashford et al. eds.,

2001) (reporting testimony by the head of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
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B. The Emerging Duty ofResponsible Administration
Public administration has evolved away from the bureaucratic model
presupposed in the classic cases. This evolution has influenced civil rights
doctrine, but only fitfully and unevenly.
Bureaucracy lends itself to situations where there is confidence in relatively
stable and uniform interventions. In situations where problems and solutions are
not well understood or where intervention has to take account of varying
contexts, bureaucracy is less effective. Demand for government to respond to
social volatility and diversity has grown in recent decades. Accordingly,
administration has moved toward a style that can be called post-bureaucratic.
Post-bureaucratic organization does not focus on balancing stable rules and
lightly supervised discretion. 28 Its central mandate to senior managers is not rule
promulgation but planning, monitoring, and reassessment. Plans differ from rules
in being more comprehensive and more provisional. Monitoring is important not
only to induce compliance with the dictates of the plan but also to facilitate
learning. A key part of the manager's job is to collect and publicize information
about unanticipated problems and successes so that frontline agents can learn
from each other and the agency can learn from peer institutions engaged with

that he resisted screening inmates for mental illness "because he knew that once mentally ill individuals
were identifiable he would be responsible for treating them"). On the role of "deliberate ignorance" in
contemporary political and business misconduct, see William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and
Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibilityfor Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3-9 (2005).
28.
Our contrast between bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic organization is based on
a vast literature observing and recommending a basic transition in organizational form. Although there are
varying formulations, the contrast can be presented usefully as two ideal types: Bureaucracy,in the midtwentieth century conception, is a balance of rules and low-visibility discretion. The basic idea is to
implement a program developed at the top and revised only episodically. Frontline discretion thus tends
to be regretted and minimized. Nevertheless, because full compliance is thought unattainable and perhaps
also undesirable, a residuum of such discretion is accepted. This residuum is unavoidable because
monitoring capacity is limited; it is also potentially benign to the extent that it enables frontline workers
to mitigate harshness or waste in situations where application of the rules would be counter-productive to
their underlying purposes. Three structural features follow: (1) the paradigmatic norm is the rule. Rules
tend to be inflexible and to be interpreted formally; (2) monitoring of frontline agents focuses on
compliance with the rules, but because it is expensive and demoralizing, monitoring is limited and
reactive, focused especially on responding to complaints; and (3) rules tend to be stable, revised only
episodically and in processes centered at the top. What we call post-bureaucraticorganizationrejects both
inflexible rules and low-visibility discretion. Senior officials view program norms as provisional and
expect to develop them in light of experience gained at the frontline. Organization tries to combine
continuous improvement with transparency and frontline initiative with accountability. The characteristic
structural features are: (1) the paradigmatic norm is the plan. Plans are more comprehensive than rules,
and their norms are interpreted purposively. Frontline agents are expected to depart from such norms when
following them would be counter-productive, but agents must signal their departures in ways that trigger
review of their decisions; (2) monitoring is proactive and based on audits as well as complaints. Monitors
assess not just compliance with the norms but also the effectiveness of the practice prescribed by the
norms; and (3) norms are revised more or less continuously in the light of information from monitoring.
Frontline workers participate in the process of norm revision. For discussion and citations to the literature,
see Charles F. Sabel, A Real Time Revolution in Routines, in THE CORPORATION AS ACOLLABORATIVE
COMMUNITY 106-56 (Charles Hecksher & Paul Adler eds., 2006); Simon, OrganizationalPremises,supra
note 6. Popular accounts include PETER SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE
LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1990), and WOMACK ET AL., supranote 19.
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comparable problems. Reassessment involves deliberative engagement between
and among senior managers, frontline agents, and, where appropriate,
stakeholders, about the ends and means of intervention. Such engagement fuels
continuous rearticulation of the plan.
The rule of law implications of post-bureaucratic administration are
different from those expressed in classic civil rights doctrine. Post-bureaucratic
administration insists on self-consciousness and explicitness. Where it finds
unreflectiveness and ambiguity, it sees them not as intractable conditions of
organizational life but as symptoms of administrative failure. Where such failure
manifestly threatens civil rights values, judges can intervene without becoming
bureaucrats themselves. They can require administrators to make policies
explicit, to give reasons for them, to supervise their implementation in a
transparent way, and to reassess periodically. We should not expect public
officials to have broad discretion over the degree to which they will be
accountable for their exercise of discretion. Inducing post-bureaucratic reflection
and transparency makes practice more predictable to citizens and facilitates
political mechanisms of oversight. Transparent administrative practice makes it
easier for courts to apply whatever substantive constraints there are on practice.
Moreover, when practice is reliably articulated across jurisdictions, both courts
and political agencies may be able to derive minimum substantive standards
empirically. They can do so by determining which practices have widespread
acceptance and put pressure on outliers to adopt them (unless they can produce
good explanations for not doing so).29
This post-bureaucratic structural approach has been incorporated into some
important civil rights statutes and regulations. Instead of categorically defining
prohibited conduct, these laws mandate that actors make plans to vindicate a
value or achieve a goal, monitor the implementation of the plan, and reassess the
plan in light of experience. Examples include the provisions of the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act requiring that states plan to reduce
disproportionate minority contacts in the criminal justice system30 and those of
the Prison Rape Elimination Act requiring that prison officials plan to achieve "a
zero-tolerance standard" for sexual assault.3'

29.
Compare Tenn. v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) (invoking the articulated
practice standards in most police agencies as support for holding that deadly force cannot be used against
fleeing suspected non-violent felons), with Whren v. United States 517 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1996)
(dismissing the claim that Fourth Amendment reasonableness should be measured by "usual police
practices" or the conduct of a "reasonable [police] officer" and saying that the Court could not "plumb the
collective consciousness of law enforcement"). Pertinent here is the argument that many fundamental
public law principles develop through a process ofdeliberative engagement and experimentation that leads
to the identification and judicial condemnation of outliers. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010).

30.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 402; 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2000) (requiring state
efforts to "reduce the disproportionate number of juvenile members of minority groups who come into
contact with the juvenile justice system").
31.
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2012).
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The "reasonable accommodation" requirement for employers in the
Americans with Disabilities Act is another important development. 32 Like the
Juvenile Justice statute, it abandons the intent requirement of classic doctrine and
requires reasonable proactive assessment and mitigation of disparate impacts.
Unlike the Juvenile Justice Act and Prison Rape Act, it does not specifically
mandate planning, monitoring, and reassessment. However, it gives employers
incentives to engage in such activities in order to demonstrate compliance.
Judicial doctrine also reflects these trends, but it remains constrained by the
organizational premises of classicism. Some decisions have moved toward the
structural approach. 33 Yet, the courts still sometimes speak as if their only
options were to impose rigid rules on the one hand or to defer to unaccountable
discretion on the other. We find both progress and constraint in the key areas that
bear on policing-antidiscrimination, search and seizure, 1983 attribution, and
systemic relief.
1. Antidiscrimination.
Commenters have argued that the best way for the courts to apply general
antidiscrimination norms to second-generation problems is to recognize an
affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to investigate, assess, and mitigate
disparate harms to protected groups.34 Reasonableness would then imply the
kinds of post-bureaucratic procedures specifically mandated in statutes like the
Juvenile Justice Act and Prison Rape Act. No cases have followed this path
explicitly, but some have done so indirectly. The indirect approach treats
reasonable proactive efforts as a rebuttal to inferences drawn from evidence of
harm to protected groups.
For example, when plaintiffs produce evidence of disparate impact under
Titles VI, VII, or VIII of the Civil Rights Act, defendants must produce evidence
of a business rationale for the decisions. Although the authority varies on the
strength of this burden, it clearly requires more than a recitation of a legitimate
purpose. Employers sometimes produce elaborate, methodologically rigorous
studies that make explicit the criteria on which decisions are based and validate
the predictive value of these criteria for productivity. The courts sometimes
suggest that even demonstrably predictive criteria are unacceptable if there are

32.

42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(7) (2012) (provision of

the Americans with Disabilities Act mandating that certain public transportation systems develop plans to
accommodate disabled passengers).
33.
Rappaport, supra note 12, at 220-31, reviews cases in several constitutional areasincluding reapportionment, school desegregation, voting rights, and employment discrimination-taking
a structural ("second-order") approach to rights elaboration.
34.
Krieger, supra note 8, at 1245 (proposing that Title VII be interpreted to create a
"prescriptive duty to identify and control for errors in social perception and judgment which inevitably
occur, even among the well-intended"); Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment
Discrimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REv. 1381, 1384 (2014) (arguing for a "duty of care to avoid

unnecessarily perpetuating social segregation or hierarchy").
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equally effective (or perhaps, almost as effective) alternatives that are less
harmful to the protected group. (Perhaps a college degree predicts productivity,
but so would an honorable discharge from the military).
In theory, the purpose of the stronger rebuttal requirements is to negate the
inference that the asserted purpose is a "pretext" for purposeful discrimination.
However, rebuttal is often expensive, and it is unusual to demand this amount of
substantiation for a party's denial of wrongdoing. A better explanation for
requiring an employer to critically examine practices that disproportionately
disadvantage protected groups is that, given the stakes for the group members
and the social commitment to equality, it would be irresponsible not to examine
them. Moreover, cases holding that a demonstrably valid criterion is insufficient
when there are less harmful alternatives, even if the less harmful ones are slightly
more expensive to administer, seem to interpret the general non-discrimination
language of the Civil Rights Act to imply something like the "reasonable
accommodation" requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Pamela
Perry notes that while disparate impact doctrine usually purports to follow an
"intent theory," the more demanding cases are better understood in terms of a
"fault" theory that presupposes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid disparate
impacts. 35 At this point, the duty of non-discrimination has become in substantial
part a duty of responsible administration.
In criminal justice, however, the courts have tended to resist disparate
impact evidence and insist on direct proof of intent with respect to individual
discrimination claims. 3 6 As discussed below, class claims for systemic relief are
another matter.

Antidiscrimination and
35.
Perry, supra note 9, at 581-91. See also Christine Jolls,
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 651-683 (2001) (demonstrating that many cases decided under
authority that does not explicitly require reasonable accommodation impose liability for the defendant's
failure to mitigate harm to protected groups even though mitigation is costly).
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (holding that a showing that
36.
a prosecutorial policy had a "discriminatory effect" was insufficient and that a challenger must show "that
the government intended such a result"); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469-70 (1996)
(holding that a litigant alleging selective prosecution must plead specifically that similarly situated people
were treated differently before pursuing discovery); Angela Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and
Privilegeof Discretion, 67 FOROHAM L. REV. 13, 31 (1998) (asserting that Armstrong makes challenges
to selective prosecution a "virtual impossibility"); Samuel Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work:
Racial Profilingand Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MicH. L. REV. 651, 741 (2002) (stating that
no case has approved suppression on the basis of statistical proof). Also pertinent here is Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which permits "pretextual" police stops by holding that the Fourth
Amendment requirement of probable cause does not require that there be such cause for the suspicion that
motivated the stop as long as there is cause for suspicion of some crime, for example, a minor traffic
violation. Whren was formally a Fourth Amendment case, but the plaintiff specifically argued for judicial
regulation on the ground that pretextual stops facilitated race discrimination. Some believe that, given the
difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, Whren "conferred upon police virtual carte blanche to stop
people because of the color of their skin." I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1.4(e), at 122 (3d
ed. 1996).

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 33, 2016

2. Search and Seizure.
Of the four doctrines we are considering, substantive search and seizure
doctrine has evolved the least, though its limitations are increasingly
recognized.3 7

The dominant perspective in substantive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
has been the autonomous officer. The courts most often assess the "objective
reasonableness" of challenged practice from the point of view of the individual
officer at the point where she decides whether to intervene.38 Courts have
recognized a duty on the part of that officer to make reasonable efforts to inform
herself within the confines of the situation. 39 Where the inference that prompted
the initial stop is "dispelled by information gained" in the course of the stop, she
must forego further detention or search.4 ° But neither the officer nor the
department is accountable for her state of knowledge priorto the encounter. This
is important because this ex ante knowledge is not independent of the
department's practices. It is a function of the policing styles and structures the
department chooses. A department that invests in gathering intelligence and
making it available to frontline officers may stop people who turn out to be lawabiding less frequently than one that does not. Yet, at least under substantive
doctrine, the reasonableness inquiry does not extend to the agency's background
efforts to develop information.
The court has emphasized the narrowness of the range within which the
reasonableness norm operates. In Whren v. UnitedStates, the Supreme Court said
that Fourth Amendment regulatory efforts were largely for "searches or seizures
conducted in an extraordinary manner," such as those involving deadly force,
entry into dwellings, or bodily invasion.4 Whren involved a more routine
"pretextual" search in which the police used a traffic violation, for which there
was probable cause, as an excuse for a search motivated by suspicion of a more
serious crime. After holding that motive was irrelevant to "objective
reasonableness," the Court went on to state that any probable cause was sufficient
to establish reasonableness. The Court recognized that enforcement of traffic
laws is massively under-inclusive but denied that Fourth Amendment
reasonableness imposed any constraint on decisions as to what searches and
seizures to conduct among those for which there is probable cause.42 In another

37.
E.g., Rappaport, supra note 12, at 231-64 (arguing for more emphasis on secondorder judicial regulation under the Fourth Amendment).
38.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
39.
E.g., United States v. Brugal, 185 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding a search
unreasonable where defendant explained his initially suspicious highway exit by saying that he needed
gas and the officer could have verified by examining gas gauge), rev'den banc, 209 F.3d 353 (4th Cir.
2000).
40.
Brugal, 185 F.3d at 210. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (defining
the Fourth Amendment standard for a police stop as the "reasonable suspicion" of an individual officer).
41.

Whren, 517U.S. at818.

42.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 816-19.
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case, the Court specifically rejected the suggestion that there should be any
obligation to adopt 43the "less restrictive alternative" among the available
enforcement options.
Under current doctrine, then, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness norm
does not regulate the agency's efforts to develop information or its enforcement
strategy. The persistent bureaucratic conception of organization explains this
limitation. For the court, constraint must take the form of a more or less
44
categorical rule. When such rules are infeasible, the court must withdraw.
Again, however, the story becomes more complicated when we look at
attribution doctrine and remedial practice in class actions.
3. Attribution.
Doctrine has moved considerably on the issue of when institutions will be
chargeable for the wrongful conduct of subordinate agents.
The most dramatic development has been in the private sector under Title
VII. In Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton, the Supreme Court adopted an approach

designed to avoid both strict liability and judicial withdrawal. This was a sexual
harassment case in which the plaintiff proved many instances of indisputable
misconduct on the part of middle- and lower-level employees. The Court rejected
the defendant's claim that liability required "active or affirmative, as opposed to
passive or implicit, misuse of supervisory authority."4 5 Instead, it held that such
workplace misconduct would be presumptively attributed to the employer.
However, the employer could rebut this presumption by showing "that it had
exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might
occur, and that the complaining employee had failed to exercise like reasonable
care."4 6 Faragher appears to have prompted pervasive corporate efforts to
develop and monitor sexual misconduct policies.
In the public sector, courts in 1983 cases have qualified the classical
insistence on top-level authorization by holding that "deliberate indifference" on
the part of senior administrators will suffice. Like "discriminatory intent,"
deliberate indifference is a concept that owes more to doctrinal desperation than

43.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350-51 (2001) ("The logic of such
elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually
all search-and-seizure powers.") (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 n.12
(1976)).
44.
Whren, 517 U.S. at818-19 ("[W]e are aware ofno principle that would allowusto
decide at what point . . . infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of
enforcement.").
45.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998).
46.
Faragher,524 U.S. at 805. See also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998) (recognizing as part of an affirmative defense to a sexual harassment claim that "the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly" harassing behavior). For interpretations that
see such cases as a more general trend, see Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 15-20; Ford, supra note 34, at
1403-15; and Sturm, supra note 3, at 479-521.
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psychological insight. In practice, it is established by passivity in the face of
knowledge of subordinate misconduct. In addition, courts have recognized 1983
liability for inadequate training, supervision, and screening of employees. 47 In
some respects, the doctrine parallels the enforcement duties recognized in the
Title VII employment context in Faragher.However, the 1983 authority has yet
48
to specifically recognize duties to promulgate policies and acquire information.
Perhaps the duty to "supervise" is broad enough to encompass such activities. If
so, it would be a small step in principle from this authority to a duty of
responsible administration. Some commentators, however, are pessimistic about
49
the practical prospects for such expansion.
The rejection of respondeat superior in favor of "deliberate indifference"
for the purposes of attribution has committed the courts to make some judgments
about the adequacy of administrative effort. Doing so requires them to broaden
the individualistic perspective they often adopted in substantive discrimination
and search and seizure doctrine. Substantive doctrine takes the local perspective
of the frontline officer in a particular situation either subjectively (with
discrimination) or objectively (with search and seizure). Attribution requires that
we step back and examine some of the factors that determined how he got there.
4. Structural Relief.
While the Supreme Court has on occasion cautioned lower courts against
excessive zeal, it has not categorically denied the legitimacy of systemic relief,
and the lower courts have given such relief against a broad range of public
authorities.
Rizzo and Lyons did not end structural relief against police departments. In
a few cases, Rizzo has been distinguished by proof of a larger number of instances
of unlawful conduct or by evidence of explicit or implicit managerial approval
or encouragement.5" Lyons has not been applied to several racial profiling claims,

47.

Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 419 (1997); City of Oklahoma v.

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 813 (1985); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (1992).

48.
But see Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 588 F.3d 445, 454 (7th Cir. 2009)
(finding as evidence that plaintiff's injuries arose from official policy "the failure to have a system in
place to allow prompt review of inmates' medical requests, the practice of severely under-staffing
correctional officers, and the failure to fix broken video monitors" (emphasis added)).
49.

See Barbara Armacost, OrganizationalCulture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 453,486-90 (2004) (asserting that "failure to train cases are notoriously difficult to litigate
and even more difficult to win" and discussing a remarkable example).
50.
E.g., Thomas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that
after Rizzo, "[slpecific findings of a persistent pattern of misconduct supported by a fully defined record
can support broad injunctive relief"); Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486, 1501
(9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a permanent injunction against the California Highway Patrol's citation policy,
citing Thomas, where the citations received by the plaintiffs were "the result of a clear CHP citation policy
in violation of the Fourth Amendment"); Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 322 (3d Cir. 1981)

(upholding injunctive relief against a police officer, mayor, and chief of police where the police chief,
"unlike the city officials in Rizzo v. Goode, . . . had knowledge and was intimately involved" in

encouraging the police officer's violation of civil rights).

Police Accountability
which can be understood to involve a diffuse stigmatic injury to an entire group,
51
and many systemic search and seizure claims have a racial dimension.
Moreover, standing is not a problem for the federal government. In 1994, in the
aftermath of the Rodney King trial and the ensuing riots, Congress authorized
the federal government to seek relief against a "pattern or practice" of police
52
conduct that violated federal law.
In any event, most cases settle. No doubt these settlements reflect some
feeling by defendants that they are vulnerable under the substantive law.
However, some, including Cincinnati and New York, have been influenced by
political forces catalyzed by the suit. And while defendants usually resent the
continuing "outside" scrutiny that settlements require, much of what the
settlements prescribe involves practices that many peer departments have
adopted voluntarily and are widely considered to be good practice within the
professional community. Peer acceptance may make the provisions more
palatable to some defendants. The fact that cases settle for reasons not entirely
dependent on the substantive merits opens space for negotiated remedies to
depart from the technical eccentricities of doctrine.
Although there is substantial variation among remedies, some best-practice
norms seem to be emerging. In particular, about twenty agreements concluded
by the Department of Justice have had wide-ranging influence outside of the
cases in which they were negotiated. According to Samuel Walker and Carol
Archbold, they have defined "the core elements of [a] new police
accountability."5 3
Walker and Archbold call the dominant pattern PTSR, for Policy, Training,
Supervision, and Review. 54 It includes requirements that the agency promulgate
detailed standards, train staff in the standards, and monitor compliance with
them. (A major part of the plaintiff's evidence in the recent New York case was
based on records that the defendant was required to keep under a consent decree
in an earlier case). 55 The core of the new monitoring regime consists of (1)
civilian complaint procedures; (2) use-of-force or critical-incident policies that
require investigations wherever police use or threaten physical force; and (3)
early intervention systems that use civilian complaints and use-of-force reports
51.

Brandon Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling

Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815 (2000).
52.
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).
53.

SAMUEL E. WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, ThE NEW WORLD OF POLICE

ACCOUNTABILITY 192 (2014). For a detailed account of a notable decree with a favorable appraisal of its
success, see CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD (2009).
WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supranote 53, at 16; see also Armacost, supra note 49, at
54.

528-31 (discussing DOJ consent decree practice). See Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional
PrisonConditions,94 HARv. L. REV. 626,638-40 (1981) (noting converging remedial provisions in prison
cases: "while they are not constitutional rights as such, they seem to represent the criteria of legality and
therefor are more than mere remedies").
55.
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp.2d 540, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing
Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003)).
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to detect patterns of poor performance by individual officers or their
supervisors and intervene with warnings, training, or discipline. While the
settlements typically describe substantive policies minimally or vaguely, they
often go into detail about procedure. For example, the Oakland, California
consent decree specifies twenty indicators to be tracked in the department's early
56
intervention system.
The complaint, early intervention, and use-of-force processes generate
signals designed to alert managers to problems. At a minimum, managers should
consider whether the signals suggest a need for individual training, counseling,
or discipline. More ambitiously, review may consider systemic implications.
Department of Justice standards provide that use-of-force assessments should
"include an examination of the police tactics and the precipitating events that led
to the use of force" and consideration of whether the incident "suggests the
advisability of revising or reformulating agency policy, strategy, tactics, or
training." 57 Although limited to use-of-force review, such measures move the
agency in the direction of the continuous and systemic reassessment demanded
by post-bureaucratic organization. They treat error not as idiosyncratic, but as
potentially symptomatic of broader dysfunction.
III. The Evolution of Policing
The key organizational assumptions of classic civil rights doctrine-that
managers control subordinate conduct mainly through rules and that minimally
accountable frontline discretion is inevitable-fit well with both the ideology and
practice of mid-twentieth century policing. However, policing has changed more
than doctrine. The dominant policing models are post-bureaucratic. Their
implications for civil rights remediation are ambiguous because postbureaucratic administration can take different forms. We illustrate the range of
possibilities with two cases: AP in New York and POP in Cincinnati.
A. From Reaction to Proaction
Policing was one of the key cases for mid-twentieth century sociologists
seeking to revise the idea of bureaucracy to acknowledge that the top-down rules
emphasized in Max Weber's conception 58 virtually always co-existed with lowvisibility frontline discretion. Tacit discretion could take a malign form as

56.

WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 53, at 148.
57.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY: EXAMPLES
OF PROMISING POLICE PRACTICES AND POLICIES 5 (2001). For an example, see POLICE ASSESSMENT
RESOURCE CTR., THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU: OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS AND IN-CUSTODY

DEATHS 143-60 (2003).
58.
1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 212-301 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoffet al. trans., 1978).
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arbitrariness or corruption or a benign form as contextual adaptation, but it was
considered in one form or another unavoidable.59
In this mid-century view, which was shared by both academics and officers,
policing was dominantly reactive. Police responded to calls for service and
reports of crimes. Their key measures of success were response time for the
former and case closure rates for the latter. Police also patrolled, but patrol tended
to be undirected or directed in terms of broad "sector-and-shift" categories. As
James Q. Wilson reported, "[F]ew police administrators show much interest in
'planning' the deployment of their manpower and equipment. There is no
information-and in the nature of the case, there can never be sufficient
information-on the effects of alternative police strategies on the several kinds
of crime.

60

Policing in this view was also incident-based. The basic unit of analysis was
a threatened or completed breach of law or public order. Incidents were selfcontained. Departments credited officers with success where they prevented a
harm, sanctioned a completed wrong, or mediated a dispute to the satisfaction of
those involved. Their interventions were limited to traditional law-enforcement
strategies-interrogations, arrests, warnings, or guidance about legal
requirements.
Internal control and accountability were weak, and external control was
highly limited. The courts held police accountable to civil rights norms in the
cases that reached them, but these represented only a very small fraction of police
activity. In principle, electoral control of local government held police
accountable, but the political levers-appointment of top-level officials and
budgetary control-were crude, and voters and civilian officials had limited
information. The most salient indicators-aggregate measures of crime and
disorder-were thought only weakly correlated with police efficacy.
Beginning in the 1980s, the mid-century view was gradually repudiated in
favor of a post-bureaucratic view. 6 1 Inthis latter view, stable top-down rules are
supplemented, and in some respects displaced, by more flexible norms-notably,
plans and indicators. Plans are more comprehensive but more provisional than
rules, and indicators measure results rather than dictate practice. The basic unit
of analysis in the new view is not the incident but the pattern or the problem.
Incidents that claim the attention of the police tend to recur at a particular
location, harm a recurring victim, and/or involve a recurring perpetrator. These
incidents often have common causes that call for coordinated responses.
Proactive organizations "map"crime incidents to determine where and how they
should concentrate their efforts.

59.
A classic expression of this view is JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (1968). See also
HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 5-30 (1990) (characterizing the view critically).
60.
WILSON, supra note 59, at 60.
61.
See WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 53, at 1-56.
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The new view breaks with prior assumptions about discretion. While the
old view treated discretion as a residual, barely licit category, the new one
explicitly encourages it. At the same time, it insists that discretion be
accountable. Decisions and strategies are reviewed both before and after the fact
through various procedures by supervisors, peers, and stakeholders.
B. Two Trajectoriesof Reform: Assertive Policing vs. Problem-Oriented
Policing
As described so far, the proactive view has become a consensus. But at this
level of generality, it has basic ambiguities. Recent discussion of policing
simmers with new concepts. Two contrasting ideal types best illustrate the range
of variation: AP and POP. Both are the subjects of extensive literatures. 62 We
focus in particular on experiences with AP in New York from 1993 through
2013, and with POP in Cincinnati from 2001 to the present. We do not offer a
comprehensive account of either regime, but our contrast captures differences in
tone and emphasis. Neither city has implemented any single model fully and both
regimes contain elements from both of our ideal types.
Moreover, both AP and POP are controversial. New York has observed
remarkable reductions in crime over more than two decades, but the causes of
these reductions have been unclear, and the city's style of policing provoked
massive political opposition for its effects on racial minorities. A federal district
court partially enjoined the department's "stop-and-frisk" practice in 2013, and
Bill de Blasio partially repudiated the practice during his mayoral campaign and
upon assuming office in 2014.63 Cincinnati has seen substantial crime reductions
in recent years, but again, the causes remain to be demonstrated. However, there
is evidence that police relations with minority communities have improved, and
64
there have been some notable local crime-control successes.
62.
For discussions of AP, see KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T, ASSERTIVE POLICING,
PLUMMETING CRIME: THE NYPD TAKES ON CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY (1999); JACK MAPLE & CHRIS
MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD GUYS OUT OF BUSINESS (1999); ELI SILVERMAN,
NYPD BATrLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN POLICING (1999); and Dennis C. Smith & William
J. Bratton, PerformanceManagement in New York City: COMPSTA T and the Revolution in Police
Management, in QUICKER, BETTER, CHEAPER?: MANAGING PERFORMANCE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 453-82 (Dail W. Forsythe ed., 2001). For discussions of POP, see HERMAN J.
GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990); and MICHAEL S. SCOTT & STUART KIRBY, CTR.
FOR PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING, IMPLEMENTING POP: LEADING, STRUCTURING, AND MANAGING A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICE AGENCY (2012).
63.
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). For de
Blasio's campaign

position, see Safe Streets, Safe Neighborhoods Across New

York City,

BILLDEBLASIO.COM, http://www.billdeblasio.com/issues/crime-fighting-public-safety (last visited Sept.
21, 2015) (on file with Yale Journalon Regulation); for his position as mayor, see Benjamin Weiser &
Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2014, at Al. Bratton left as New York chief in late 1994. He subsequently served as chief in Los
Angeles and was then re-appointed chief in New York in 2013. His thinking had evolved since his
departure, and on return, he distanced himself from the regime in place.
64.
CINCINNATI POLICE DEP'T ET AL., COLLABORATIVE AGREEMENT ANNUAL
PROBLEM SOLVING REPORT (2006) [hereinafter 2006 PROBLEM SOLVING REPORT] (reporting some local
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In broad summary, the AP model assumes the efficacy of standard
interventions, especially stops and arrests. It uses data on crime incidence to
rapidly deploy resources to "hot spots" and to hold officers down the chain of
command accountable for rapid responses to crime indicators. The regime deemphasizes rules and induces some initiative at the precinct command level.
However, like the bureaucracy against which it reacts, it remains a principalagent model of action. It assumes that the principal or senior official can
confidently know what needs to be done and that the chief organizational
problem is inducing subordinate agents to execute the plan.
By contrast, POP assumes that standard responses are typically ineffective,
even when efficiently directed to high-crime areas. It looks for a broader array
of patterns than AP, aspires to analyze them more deeply, and customizes
solutions. Like AP, POP maps spatially, but it analyzes in more detail and views
crime occurrences as evidence of environmental and social conditions that
facilitate crime. It then tries to devise interventions that disrupt or reconfigure
these conditions. POP also employs a form of pattern analysis that focuses on
violent people as well as places. When it identifies persistent offenders, it
responds with a package of threats, offers of social services, and moral
65
exhortation tailored to the specific circumstances of the actors.
POP draws on knowledge and encourages initiative from both frontline
officers and community members. While AP tends to emphasize the lines
between supervisors and beat officers and between the police and the
66
community, POP tends to blur them.

successes); ROBIN S. ENGEL & M. MURAT OZER, CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT 2014 CRIME

SUMMARY: A DECADE INREVIEW (2015) (on file with authors) (reporting a 40.5 percent reduction in
violent crimes, a 33.8 percent reduction in citizen complaints, and a 64.5 percent reduction in use-of-force
incidents from 2004 to 2014); GREG RIDGEWAY ET AL., POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI

(2009) (reporting improvements in popular perceptions of police following court-supervised reforms
involving problem-oriented policing); Robin S. Engel et al., Reducing Gang Violence Using Focused
Deterrence:Evaluating the CincinnatiInitiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), JUST. Q. 1. 28-32 (2011)

(methodologically sophisticated study finding that Cincinnati's anti-violence initiative has been effective).
Cincinnati's police force is much smaller than New York's (991 officers versus 34,555), and has
considerably fewer police personnel per capita (37.6 per 10,000 versus 59.5 per 10,000). Police
Employment,

Officers
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for

U.S.

Cities,

GOVERNING.COM,

http://www.goveming.com/gov-data/safety-justice/police-offcers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-citydepartments.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). Cincinnati has a significantly higher poverty rate (31.3

versus
20.9).
U.S.
City
Poverty
Rankings,
SYRACUSE.COM,
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/20l4/09/uscitypovertyrankings look up compare-nations

biggest cities.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
65.
This approach to violence is often referred to as "focused deterrence" or "pulling
levers policing," but as one of its originators notes, it is best considered an elaboration of POP. David M.
Kennedy, Old Wine in New Bottles: Policingand the Lessons of Pulling Levers, in POLICE INNOVATION
160 (David Weisburd & Anthony Braga eds., 2006).

66.

AP resembles what some reformers call "new public management." See

Christopher Hood, The "New Public Management "in the 1980s: Variationson a Theme, 20 ACCT. ORGS.
& SOC'Y 93 (1995). POP resembles what we call "experimentalism." See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 4.

Neither term seems common in the policing field.
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1. Assertive Policing
a. Strategy.
Since 1993, when William Bratton became Chief of Police for the first time,
New York has, in both practice and self-presentation, emphasized AP. The basic
strategy was to identify and then take control of crime-infested locales "by street
stops of suspicious-looking persons, by frisking after stops for weapons or
contraband, and by making arrests for minor offenses as a way to remove
' 67
perceived risks from the street and to identify persons wanted for other crimes.
The strategy was initiated with major investments in Compstat-information
technology that enables prompt identification of geographic patterns, or "hot
spots." Commanders are expected to deploy patrol officers promptly to these
locations and then to redeploy them as data indicate changes in crime incidence.
The strategy was summarized by Jack Maple, Bratton's principal deputy at the
time the regime was established, as "cops on dots." Maple and others called Chief
of Patrol Louis Anemone "our Patton," invoking the World War I general
68
associated with mobile tank warfare.
The visible presence of police at a hot spot might reduce crime, but AP did
not rely only on presence. It prescribed confronting and searching people who
appeared to be engaged in illegal activity, and arresting or citing people for
offenses either observed by the officers or discovered when suspects were
stopped and searched. Police occasionally observed serious offenses, and
searches occasionally discovered unlicensed guns. But most arrests and
summonses were for minor offenses; the largest category involved marijuana
use. The regime designers saw such activity as deterring serious crime for various
reasons. Although it was not part of the official explanation, evidence at the
federal trial suggested that some officers thought that aggressively confronting
young men would instill general fear that inhibited criminal activity. 69 The
"broken windows" theory formulated by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson
suggested that "quality-of-life" policing could prevent the emergence of hot
spots in transitional neighborhoods by encouraging law-abiding people to act as
70
crime-inhibiting "eyes on the street" and to provide information to the police.
Bratton and Maple favored minor-offense enforcement in high-crime
neighborhoods because it enabled the police to put pressure on people they
believed, but could not prove, were engaged in more serious offenses.
Prosecution for minor offenses might temporarily incapacitate such people; it

67.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK'S LESSONS FOR
URBAN CRIME CONTROL 118 (2012).
68.
KENNEDY SCH., supra note 62, at 17-21; MAPLE & MITCHELL, supra note 62, at
31, 120; Smith & Bratton, supra note 62, at 457-62.
69.
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
70.
George Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC (March 1982).
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induce
might lead to more intensive surveillance through probation; or it 7might
1
them to provide intelligence about the criminal activities of others.
The regime tended to assume that, within a hot spot, criminal activity was
diffuse, interconnected, and relatively homogeneous. Thus, it focused on broadly
targeted and uniform interventions. It considered the appropriate response, more
often than not, to be an increase in stops, searches, and arrests. From January
2004 to June 2012, the NYPD documented 4.4 million street stops. At its peak
in 2011, it made 686,000. Half of the stops were followed by a search for
weapons, and twelve percent led to arrests or summons, most for minor
offenses. 72 For the department, a major performance indicator-perhaps the
major performance indicator-has been the quantity of stops and related
enforcement activity. The city denied that there have ever been enforcement
quotas for precincts or officers either before or after a 2010 ordinance forbidding
them. But evidence at trial, including recordings of precinct meetings and
surveys of officers, indicated that commanders and officers felt strong pressure.
Moreover, a senior police manager testifying at trial acknowledged that the
number of stops was one factor in performance assessment. His main
qualification was that the department also considered the "quality" of stops,
which he defined73 repeatedly as "one that's in the right place, the right time, for
the right crime.
The designers emphasized motivation, rather than innovation, as the key
shortcoming in the prior regime. 74 Decades of complacent management and poor
morale had left officers timid and indolent. They needed to be pushed. Thus,
reforming managers used their control over promotions to reward the conduct
they approved, and they used meetings with borough and precinct commanders
to publicly honor and shame in accordance with their views of performance.75 A

71.

KENNEDY SC[., supranote 62, at 9-13; MAPLE & MITCHELL, supranote 62, at 153-

56; ZIMRING, supra note 67, at 117-31.

72.
Floyd,959 F. Supp. 2d at 573-75.
Transcript of Testimony by Joseph Esposito, Chief of Dep't, New York City Police
73.
Dep't, at 2983, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 1034)
[hereinafter "Transcript of Esposito Testimony"]; Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 592-607. Following the
court's ruling, William Bratton, having resumed the role of chief,acknowledged that under his predecessor
officers were "pushed hard" to increase stops and frisks. Pervaiz Shallwani & Sean Gardiner, NYPD
Officers "Pushed" on Stop-and-Frisk: Police Commissioner Bratton, WALL ST. J. METROPOLIS BLOG

(Jan. 30, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/01/30/nypd-officers-pushed-on-stop-andfrisk-police-commissioner-bratton.
74.
See Transcript of Esposito Testimony, supra note 73, at 3020, 3039 (discussing
problems of motivating underperforming officers); MAPLE & MITCHELL, supra note 62, at 7
(characterizing the majority of officers on most forces as lazy or indolent).
"One officer [in Lowell, Massachusetts] described Compstat as a forum where
75.
officers had their 'balls ripped off and surmised that this only served to make individuals 'reluctant to
speak up ... reluctant to do their job."' JAMES J. WILLIS ET AL., COMPSTAT AND ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE IN THE LOWELL POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 (2003). Some assert that such pressures have led to
cheating on reports. See, e.g., JOHN ETERNO & ELI SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME:
MANAGEMENT BY MANIPULATION (2012).
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precinct commander won approval by showing mastery of current data about
crime patterns and by quickly deploying officers in response.
The effect of AP on centralization is complex. The key focus of the regime
designers was on the precinct commanders. They were subject to more intensive
scrutiny from the center, but since this scrutiny was focused on results, it left
them discretion with respect to tactics. As we have noted, however, commanders
had less discretion in practice because of the pressure to show immediate
response to crime rate increases and the presumption that the appropriate
response was to stop-search-arrest. It appears that commanders did not
encourage initiative on the part of frontline officers. 76 Bratton has stated that
creativity should not be expected from patrol officers, who tend to be
77
inexperienced and untrained in the relevant skills.
Finally, AP rejects more ambitious versions of "community policing," a
philosophy that emphasizes development of deep local knowledge and active
engagement with local leaders, residents, and business owners. Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani, who brought on Bratton to inaugurate Compstat, had dismissed such a
model as "social work," a term that for him connoted timidity and sentimentality.
Bratton had a more developed critique. In addition to his skepticism about the
capacities of patrol officers, he doubted that community activists were
meaningfully representative of their communities or had much information to
contribute that could not be gathered through conventional investigatory or data
mining techniques. The original Kelling-Wilson "broken windows" idea
emphasized the contribution of law-abiding residents to crime control through
informal pressures. However, Bratton's and Maple's reinterpretation of it saw
minor-offense enforcement mainly as leverage for the police over serious
78
wrongdoers, who were assumed to be diffused throughout the community.
b. Limitations.
Despite the phenomenal declines in major crimes in New York, reservations
about AP have become prominent. Some concern limitations of its tactics as
instruments of crime control; others concern insensitivity to collateral costs.
First, the preoccupation with static efficiency-moving police to hot
spots-led to unreflective reliance on a narrow set of interventions. Officers were
not encouraged to innovate, and indeed, the emphasis on immediate response
may have inhibited impulses to do so. The most detailed account to date of
76.
A survey by the Police Foundation of Compstat nationwide found that most
frontline officers were not familiar with Compstat data and were "rarely called upon to explain a particular
decision." David Weisburd et al., Changing Everything So That Everything Can Remain the Same:
Compstat and American Policing,in POLICE INNOVATION, supra note 65, at 291.
77.
KENNEDY SCH., supranote 62, at 9-10.
78.
See KENNEDY SCH., supra note 62, at 9-10; Smith & Bratton, supra note 62, at 46672. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A RED HERRING: MARIJUANA ARRESTEES Do NOT BECOME

VIOLENT FELONS 14-15 (2012) (quoting officials and commentators asserting that marijuana arrests
contribute to declines in serious crime).
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Compstat implementation-a study of the Lowell, Massachusetts program
modeled on New York's-reports, "Compstat's data orientation did seem to
affect ... when and where responses would be mobilized, but it had generally
done little to stimulate analysis of how to actually respond on the basis of the
data."

79

Performance measures may have been too coarse for meaningful
assessment of practice. Lacking the ability to compare different interventions
within the city and uninterested in efforts elsewhere, the city tended to measure
efficacy solely in terms of crime rate declines. AP espoused the principle of
"relentless follow-up. '80 However, in practice, that notion appears to have meant,
at best, observation of whether crime rates declined following intervention, and,
at worst, observation to confirm that stop-and-frisk practices were being
implemented without any regard to their efficacy. Although crime declines were
dramatic, their relation to AP practices is ambiguous. Crime rates do not seem to
have been responsive to any fine-grained measure of changes in enforcement
practice. Trends do not seem to have been strongly affected either by the
dramatic increase in stop-and-frisk activity from 2004 to 2011, or its dramatic
8
decrease in 2012 (probably in response to the lawsuit and political protest). '
Moreover, the department's claims for the efficacy of stop-and-frisk omit many

relevant variables, including:
[A] significant increase in the New York City police force, a general shift in drug use from crack
cocaine to heroin, new computerized tracking systems that speed up police response to crime,
favorable economic conditions in the 1990s, a dip in the number of eighteen to twenty-fouryear-old males, an increase in the number of offenders currently incarcerated in city jails and
state prisons, the arrest
82 of several big drug gangs in New York, as well as possible changes in
adolescent behavior.

Second, the Compstat metrics took little or no account of major costs of the
stop-and-frisk practices. Three sorts of costs now seem especially important.

First, there are the costs of unlawful stops-stops that do not meet constitutional
79.
WILLIS ET AL., supra note 75, at 48 (emphasis omitted). The Police Foundation
study of Compstat implementation nationwide found that "[t]he vast majority of problem-solving
approaches identified in these model Compstat agencies relied on traditional police strategies that had
been used before ..." David Weisburd et al., Changing Everything, supra note 65, at 292.
80.
MAPLE & MITCHELL, supra note 62, at 32.
81.
See Philip Bump, New York Has Essentially EliminatedStop-and-Frisk - and
Crime Is Still Down, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2014/12/03/new-york-has-essentially-eliminated-stop-and-frisk-and-crime-is-still-down.
82.

BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN

WINDOWS POLICING 94 (2001). See also ZIMRING, supranote 67, at 131-50, who finds that the practice
of quickly deploying officers to "hot spots" probably had a significant impact but, like Harcourt, finds
little evidence for the efficacy of minor-offense enforcement. Studies of"hot spot policing" often blur the
distinction between AP and POP, both of which emphasize deployment on the basis of spatial patterns.
However, a recent meta-analysis that takes some account of differences in strategic frameworks concludes
that "problem-oriented policing interventions generate larger mean effect sizes when compared to
interventions that simply increase levels of traditional police actions in crime hot spots." Anthony A.
Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policingon Crime: An UpdatedSystemic Review and Meta-A nalysis,
31 JUST. Q. 633, 656 (2014).
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standards. 83 The federal district court emphasized the city's failure to make
serious effort to monitor these costs. Second, there are the costs of stops that are
lawful (because there was reasonable suspicion) but fail to produce evidence of
unlawful activity.8 4 Most of these stops cause at least inconvenience and often
anxiety and humiliation to law-abiding people. And third, there are the costs of
minor-offense enforcement to the people charged and to their families and
communities.85
The legal status of the second and third categories of costs is ambiguous,
but they have come to be viewed as important by a large fraction of New Yorkers.
Stops and minor-offense enforcement, even on otherwise adequate grounds, are
especially resented because they are disproportionately directed at minority
groups. Many now assert that the costs of minor-offense enforcement are
especially large. 86 Most of post-stop enforcement action involved offenses such
as marijuana or alcohol consumption, trespass, or non-threatening forms of
disorderly conduct. These offenses are not regarded as serious in themselves. But
each enforcement action creates a record that increases the likelihood that the
subject will receive subsequent and harsher attention from the criminal justice
system. Many create public records that will impair the subject's employment
and housing prospects.
A strategy of policing minor misconduct in high-crime neighborhoods,
even if implemented solely on the basis of non-racial indications of misconduct,
will disproportionately affect minorities because they live disproportionately in
high-crime areas. Minority neighborhoods may benefit from reduced crime, but
they will suffer to the extent that law-abiding residents find the life chances of
their friends and family members cumulatively impaired by repeated police
encounters. The department ignores these costs. Indeed, it has treated arrests and
summonses even for minor offenses as measures of success.

83.
The Floyd court found on the basis of a study of records by Jeffrey Fagan that "at
least 200,000 stops [out of 4.4 million between 2004 and 2012] were made without reasonable suspicion"
and that the "actual number ... was likely far higher." Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540,
559-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

84.
About 88 percent of the stops between 2004 and 2012 did not lead to any law
enforcement action. Id. at 953. The remaining 12 percent resulted in arrests or "summonses" (for minor
violations that do not warrant taking the person into custody), but it seems likely that many of these people
were not engaged in unlawful activity. In some years, nearly half of the charges were dismissed or
adjourned in contemplation of dismissal. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE AVr'y GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS
ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 8-9, 22-23

(2013) (reporting data from 2009 through 2012).
85.
"[O]nly 1.5 percent of stops between 2009 and 2012 resulted in a jail or prison
sentence of any duration ..... Id. at 10.
86.
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
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2. Problem-Oriented Policing
a. Strategy
Although the idea of POP antedates AP, no jurisdiction has implemented
POP with the degree of ambition and comprehensiveness with which New York
implemented AP. The problem-oriented approach is promoted and supported by
the U.S. Department of Justice and a national Center for Problem-Oriented
Policing. Several empirical studies have shown at least modest benefits from
problem-oriented initiatives.87 The approach has been embraced by many
departments, but rarely as a basis for reorganizing its core operations. And many
initiatives have proved fragile, falling victim to budget cutbacks and senior
88
management turnover.
Cincinnati adopted POP in 2002 as part of a "Collaborative Agreement"
settling one of two lawsuits challenging its use-of-force practices as
unconstitutionally arbitrary and discriminatory. The implementation process was
rocky,89 but when the agreement terminated in 2008, the court-appointed monitor
reported that the problem-oriented approach had been strongly institutionalized.
Some ground was lost subsequently due to fiscal cutbacks and managerial
turnover, but commitment to POP survived and has strengthened in recent years,
substantially due to the efforts of a group of district commanders who have had
favorable experiences with it. On a brief visit in 2014, we found officers at many
levels to be articulate and enthusiastic about POP.9"

87.
DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CAMPBELL COLLABORATION, THE EFFECTS OF
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING ON CRIME AND DISORDER (2008) (meta-analysis of POP studies
concluding that they show modest gains); Braga et al., supra note 82, at 24 (meta-analysis of "hot spots"
policing studies concluding that they show significant gains in the aggregate and generally larger gains
for problem-oriented interventions); Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime and Disorder
Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 AM. J. CRIMINOLOGY 577, 595 (2008) (describing an
experiment in Lowell, Massachusetts, in which POP-inspired treatment interventions achieved

significantly better effects than conventional practice at control sites and in which success at treatment
sites was due to "situational strategies" rather than minor offense enforcement).
88.
One city where at least moderately robust implementation has been documented is
Lowell, Massachusetts. After a disappointing experiment with New York-style Compstat, see WILLIS ET
AL., supra note 75, the City undertook POP initiatives with extensive monitoring and analysis. Reports
indicate that the efforts have become increasingly sophisticated and have been generally effective.
BRENDA J. BOND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, SMART POLICING INITIATIVE:

REDUCING PROPERTY CRIME INTARGETED HOT SPOTS (2014) (describing a subsequent initiative in which
more sophisticated POP efforts outperformed control sites); Braga & Bond, supra note 87, at 578 (2008)
(describing a 2005-06 experiment in which "shallow" POP strategies outperformed conventional
practice).
89.
Among the problems: one of the two organizational plaintiffs withdrew from the
settlement after adopting a more confrontational stance toward the City. The Community Partnering
Center-created to coordinate community involvement in problem-solving--dissolved when some
leaders opted for aggressive protest tactics at the expense of problem-solving efforts. Shortly after the
settlement, gang-related violence spiked and prompted the city to adopt AP-type stop-and-frisk practices
for a time.
90.
SAUL GREEN, MONITOR'S TRANSITION YEAR REPORT ON THE COLLABORATIVE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE CITY OF CINCINNATI (2008); John Eck & Jay Rothman,
Police Community Conflict and Crime Prevention in Cincinnati, Ohio, in PUBLIC SECURITY AND POLICE
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Cincinnati, like most cities, shows some influence of Compstat. The district
commanders meet with the chief and senior staff weekly and review current
crime data. They use the Compstat crime mapping techniques. 9' Yet, many
officers distinguish their approach from New York's. In the first place, there is a
strong rhetorical influence on innovation and creativity. The Collaborative
Agreement that mandated POP proclaimed as its core tenet that "problems are
dilemmas to be engaged and learned from."92 In particular, there is an explicit
repudiation of the idea that confrontation and arrests should be the presumptive
responses: "A law enforcement response is always a possibility, but may not be
required. Rather, a range of options is explored . . . ."" On our visit, we
frequently heard officers say, "We couldn't arrest our way out of this problem."
Examples of problems for which arrest is thought usually ineffective are street
prostitution and retail drug markets. As long as environmental conditions remain
unaltered, new recruits will take the place of those arrested or those arrested will
return when released.
Cincinnati POP proponents reject aggressive, indiscriminate "zero
tolerance" or "broken windows" enforcement. The department responded to a
spike in murders in 2006 with Operation Vortex, which included practices
resembling New York's stop-and-frisk ones, but abandoned them the following
year. Lieutenant Colonel James Whalen, who commanded Operation Vortex,
told a reporter that he had concluded that indiscriminately confrontational
approaches were "bullshit:" "Even in high crime neighborhoods, there are a lot

REFORM INTHE AMERICAS 225-37 (John Bailey & Lucia Dammert eds., 2006). We have also relied on
Ted Wojcik, Problem-Oriented Policing in Cincinnati: An Update (May 5, 2015) (on file with authors),
which is based on interviews conducted in the spring of 2015. The robustness of POP, despite turmoil in
the upper reaches of the department and its political surroundings, is explained in significant measure by
the institutional spaces that the settlement afforded younger officers attracted to innovative police
responses and the career opportunities it opened to those who proved adept at developing them. Several
in the cohort of officers who came of age under the settlement are now in or rising to senior positions and
provide critical support for POP. In addition, at least one segment of the Cincinnati regime has been
strongly institutionalized. This is the gang-focused intervention called the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce
Violence (CIRV).When inaugurated, it produced short-term success, but the effects were not sustaineda common experience with initiatives of this kind. The City concluded that implementation had suffered
from overdependence on specific personnel and informal relations. It thus undertook a thoroughgoing
reorganization, drawing on management practices devised at Proctor and Gamble, the city's major
corporate citizen. The resulting structure has an executive director who reports to a committee consisting
of the mayor and two other city-wide officials. Three multi-agency task forces formulate strategies and
revise them continuously on the basis of data produced by a monitoring committee. Marie Tillyer et al.,
Beyond Boston: Applying Theory to Understandand Address SustainabilityIssues in FocusedDeterrence
Initiativesfor Violence Reduction, 58 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 973 (2012) (analyzing the re-organization
of CIRV).
91.
An example of a project that combines creativity with Compstat-style static
efficiency concerns involves the overlay of geographical data on traffic citations with accident and crime
data to enable the deployment of traffic enforcement resources to locations where it is most likely to
prevent harm. Daniel W. Gerard, CincinnatiHAZARD: A Place-Based Traffic Enforcement and Violent
Crime Reduction Strategy, THE POLICE CHIEF, Jul. 2013, at 44, 44-46.
92.
Collaborative Agreement at 2, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. 1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 5, 2002) [hereinafter "Collaborative Agreement"].
93.
ld.at 6.
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of honest people living there. Meanwhile, the real bad guys-they know a sweep
is on, so they stay inside until things cool off."94 Where arrests are part of a
problem-oriented strategy, they are used as a last resort and applied in as
precisely targeted a way as possible. In pointing to data supporting the
effectiveness of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), the
initiative that succeeded Operation Vortex, Captain (then Lieutenant) Mars
Herald said, "[T]he results are particularly impressive because they were
95
achieved with so few arrests."
The intellectual core of problem-oriented practice is a discipline
specifically mandated by the Collaborative Agreement called SARA-Scanning,
Analysis, Response, Assessment. It begins with a precise definition of a problem,
proceeds to look for well-configured interventions, implements them, assesses
the results, and then, if the problem persists, begins the cycle anew with a revised
account of the problem in light of experience.
POP emphasizes the potential complexity of both problems and
interventions. Illustrations are given in a series of more than seventy problemspecific guides produced by the national Center for Problem-Oriented Policing
(e.g., "Assaults in and Around Bars," "Disorder at Day Laborer Sites," and
"Shoplifting"). The guide on "Street Prostitution" explains that the "problem"
associated with prostitution could be the exploitation of the prostitutes by their
pimps, harm to minors, sexually-transmitted disease, the impact of street
solicitation on neighborhood atmosphere, or exploitation of customers (notably,
by robbery). Each interpretation implies a different set of interventions, and the
problem often turns out to have many facets and require interventions with
96
multiple prongs.
In general, problems tend to emerge in two sorts of patterns. One involves
recurring criminal incidents at a common location. The other involves recurring
97
lawlessness by a single person or group.
Locational analysis in POP involves a thicker sort of mapping than in
Compstat. It includes considerations of social influence and economic
interdependence, as well as geographical incidence. 9 One set of strategies for
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John Seabrook, Don't Shoot: A Radical Approach to the Problem of Gang Violence,

THE NEW YORKER, June 22, 2009, at 32. His successor as Vortex commander, Captain Daniel Gerard,
expressed a similar view to us in an interview. Interview with Capt. Daniel Gerard, Cincinnati Police
Dep't, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Jan. 23, 2014). On Operation Vortex, see DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON'T SHOOT:
ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 232-66 (2011).
95.
Interview with Lt. Mars Herald, Cincinnati Police Dep't, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Jan.
22, 2014).
96.
MICHAEL S. SCOTT & KELLY DEDEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFFICE OF CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., STREET PROSTITUTION (2d ed. 2006).
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POP discussions sometimes add a third category-recurring victims. Domestic
violence cases would be the largest constituent. However, such cases tend to overlap with the other two
categories.
98.
See John Eck, What Do Those Dots Mean?: Mapping Theories With Data, in CRIME
MAPPING AND CRIME PREVENTION 379-406 (David Weisburd & Tom McEwen eds., 1997) (arguing that

effective mapping depends on hypotheses about the social processes producing the data). Spatial mapping
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problems identified in this manner is Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design. Interventions of this kind could involve enhancing visibility by altering
landscaping or improving lighting. Other interventions aim to make the locale
less attractive or convenient for undesirable activities. One part of a plan used to
disrupt an open-air drug market in the Kennedy Heights section of Cincinnati
was the attachment to a bridge siding of egg-shaped structures that made it
uncomfortable to sit there. Fencing below the bridge made that space unavailable
for hiding drugs. 99 Markets for drugs or prostitution can sometimes be disrupted
by rerouting traffic, for example, by making the route from the highway to a local
street corner more circuitous. The police counsel shop owners on ways to display
their merchandise that inhibit shoplifting.
Some POP strategies coordinate crime control with regulation of real
property use. Where rental properties are used as bases for drug dealing or
prostitution, the police may pressure the landlord to evict the wrongdoers. Where
neglected or abandoned property is attracting criminal activity, the police may
induce building code or public nuisance enforcement to force the owner to
improve conditions, or, in extreme cases, to forfeit the building.100 The
department has an education program to help landlords screen prospective
tenants for illegal activity and to identify and respond to such activity when it
occurs. Empty buildings have unhealthy neighborhood effects, including
attracting crime. The department therefore tries to work with developers to
stabilize or renovate buildings critical to its public safety strategies. District 3
recently developed a strategy of this kind for the East and Lower Price Hill
neighborhoods in collaboration with neighborhood activists, the city building
and health departments, and the Port of Cincinnati.' 0 1
Public officials also use liquor law enforcement strategically. Bars
associated with public drunkenness are likely to be threatened with loss of their
liquor licenses if they do not become more careful about refusing to serve
intoxicated patrons. One initiative mitigated a problem of chronic disorderly
behavior at a particular street comer by persuading a local convenience store to
stop selling beer in forty-ounce containers.

in AP is typically based on jurisdictional boundaries or abstract statistical properties. See JOHN ECK ET
AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NAT'L INST. OF JUST., MAPPING CRIME: UNDERSTANDING HOT SPOTS (2005).

99.
2006 PROBLEM SOLVING REPORT, supranote 64, at 22.
100.
Strategies of this kind are used in many cities, including New York. Building and
liquor law enforcement are the principal non-confrontational strategies commonly mentioned in the
Compstat literature.
101.
For a more extensive account of a highly-regarded POP initiative that combined
policing and economic development, see the report by Kansas City's police chief on the city's response
to disorder at day labor hiring sites. The city and local stakeholder groups organized and built a center that
provides services to workers and employers while regulating the hiring process in ways that limit traffic
disruption and criminal activity. See James Corwin, Day Laborers: Improving the Quality of Life for
Laborers, Employers, and Neighbors, THE POLICE CHIEF, Apr. 2006.
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The most prominent responses to problems defined in terms of offenders,
as opposed to places, are developed through CIRV.1 °2 CIRV begins with an effort
to identify violent offenders and their social networks. Its strategies emphasize
four basic elements: (1) credible threats directed to recurrent law-breakers of
harsh sanctions in the event of further violence, (2) efforts to mobilize peer
pressures by threatening sanctions against the group if any member offends, (3)
moral exhortation by community leaders, and (4) offers of social services to help
with medical or psychological problems or to improve access to employment.
The most distinctive practice is the "call in." Gang members are "invited" (for
those on probation or parole, the invitation is mandatory) to meetings where
teams of police, prosecutors, community leaders, and social service providers
deliver the combination of threats, exhortations, and offers of help.
To be credible, the threats must be targeted at known wrongdoers, and,
ideally, accompanied by demonstrations that the authorities have enough
evidence to prosecute them for past misdeeds should they reoffend. (The teams
sometimes show videotapes at the call-ins of audience members engaged in drug
dealing or vandalism). One reason why targeted threats are more credible then
generalized ones is that offenders know that authorities do not have the resources
to follow through on the latter. But they can follow through on targeted threats,
and of course, to maintain credibility, they must do so. Thus, arrest and
prosecution, sometimes for minor offenses, is a key part of CIRV, but they are
used only as a last resort and only against the persistently violent.
The basic POP model prescribes that, after the initial intervention is
deployed, its efficacy must be assessed and, if necessary, the intervention
recalibrated. In principle, a good initial plan should specify measures of efficacy,
though these may have to be revised as understanding of the problem changes.
Crime reports and calls for service are usually key measures, but others,
including customized ones, are feasible.
The most systematic assessments have been performed in connection with
CIRV. They have shown at least modest success, measured by gang-related
violent incidents with appropriate controls. But they have also raised questions
about the effectiveness of particular practices. Social services have been a
particular concern. When indicators suggested services were not contributing to
the reductions in violence, the program adjusted. It intensified service monitoring
through a multi-agency committee that meets monthly. And it reconfigured the
menu of services, focusing less on job readiness and more on psychological
issues such as anger management or interpersonal coping. It also sought to target
10 3
the offers more precisely at individuals with strong propensities for violence.
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The problem-oriented approach pushes Cincinnati toward a more
decentralized administration than New York-style AP. The design of contextual
strategies depends on information from beat officers and local residents. These
people, David M. Kennedy emphasizes:
[K]now who is in what street groups, and who is fighting with whom; what last year's antecedent
to yesterday's shooting was; who is committing the drug robberies that are not even being
reported to the police; who is selling drugs on the comers; what mid-level dealer is running the
crack house operated only by juveniles; what turf is claimed by which groups and who is allowed
there and who is not; which domestic violence offenders are currently dangerous to what
women. 104

Kennedy notes that other policing regimes "generally make little use of this
frontline knowledge, partly because it is often of no use in making cases and
partly because ... top-down management" inhibits access to it.t 05

The precise allocation of responsibility among different levels of
administration is still a matter of discussion. All but the most local problems
require initiative on the part of division commanders or central staff. Yet a
premise of the Collaborative Agreement was that officers at all levels should be
capable of participating in problem-solving efforts. Under the Agreement, all
new recruits were trained in problem-solving methods. In principle, problemsolving ability is one of the criteria on which officers are evaluated. Because of
fiscal constraints, there were no new recruits from 2008 through 2014, and as we
have noted, the culture of problem-solving languished for some years.
Nevertheless, at least some patrol officers identify with POP. This is especially
true of the "neighborhood officers" with specific local beats. One such officer
recently initiated a project to disrupt a local drug market by re-designating some
streets as one-way. As part of an initiative to address cellphone thefts, he drafted
and helped secure passage of an ordinance requiring pawnshops that accept
10 6
cellphones as collateral to report them to the police.
The Collaborative Agreement embodied an ambitious conception of
community engagement that has not been fully realized but nevertheless
continues to influence practice. The agreement was formulated in the course of
a series of open meetings and roundtables orchestrated by an expert in the
mediation of civic disputes, and this type of engagement continues. In recent
years, the department has conducted periodic "town hall" meetings in each of the
t0 7
city's five divisions.

(2012) (meta-analysis concluding that nine of ten relevant studies show significant effects for
"focused deterrence" interventions, though also noting that the studies lack rigor).
104.
Kennedy, supra note 65, at 160.
105.
Id.
106.
Interview with Officer David Epstein, Cincinnati Police Dep't, in Cincinnati, Ohio
(Jan. 24, 2014).
107.
On the community engagement that preceded the settlement, see Eck & Rothman,
supra note 90; on town hall meetings, see Cincinnati Police Department to Hold District Town Hall
ON CRIME
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In addition to this relatively passive participation, local stakeholders often
play roles in formulating and implementing specific strategies. The department
has worked with social service agencies to develop assistance for prostitutes open
to exploring other means of supporting themselves. Job-related services are an
important part of the CIRV violence reduction strategy. Some strategies
incorporate efforts to increase the presence of law-abiding citizens at strategic
times and places. Community groups may agree to turn out members as part of
strategies to evict disorderly activity from a contested public space. The
in which volunteers observe
department has a Citizens on Patrol program
10 8
problems.
report
and
designated locations
A remark in one of our interviews suggests how the reconception of
policing promoted by POP parallels and converges with changes in other fields.
In discussing his work with a community development organization in
Cincinnati's Walnut Hills neighborhood, Captain Daniel Gerard noted that he
saw similarities between this work and that of a friend involved in economic and
institutional development efforts as an army officer in Helmand Province,
Afghanistan. The implication of the comparison is that POP more closely
resembles the counter-insurgency model of warfare associated with General
David Patraeus than General Patton's mobile tank tactics invoked by Bratton to
explain Compstat. Like POP, the counter-insurgency approach prescribes that
patrol, response to incidents, and use-of-force be coordinated with diverse,
proactive initiatives that engage civilians with a stake in achieving security. The
goal is to secure terrain by building a viable community, not by attempting to
annihilate all potentially hostile forces. POP-influenced police offers often say
"we couldn't arrest our way out of this problem." Likewise, David Petraeus often
said in Iraq that "we would not be able to kill or capture our way out of" problems
09
there.'
b. Limitations
Since POP has rarely been rigorously and comprehensively implemented,
it is difficult to separate limitations that arise from inadequate implementation

Meetings,

CtNCINNATI-OH.GOV,

http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/news/cincinnati-police-

department-to-hold-district-town-hall-meetings (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
108.
Officers have cultivated ties with organized community interlocutors. The District
3 commander sat on the board of the Walnut Hills Redevelopment Foundation. Another district
commander helped organize and sat on the board of the Faith Community Alliance of Greater Cincinnati,
a group of clergy, community leaders, and social service providers that "serves as a conduit between the
community and local government." Interview with Capt. Daniel Gerard, supra note 94; interview with
Capt. Gary Lee, Cincinnati Police Dep't, in Cincinnati, Ohio (Jan. 24, 2014).
109.
David Petraeus, Forewordto PETER R. MANSOOR, SURGE: MY JOURNEY WITH
DAVID PETRAEUS AND THE REMAKING OF THE IRAQ WAR ix, xxii (2013). Two other Cincinnati officers-

Captain Maris Herald, a former social worker, and Sergeant Julian Johnson, a former school teachercompared their practice to social work. This is the same analogy Mayor Giuliani used, but for these
officers it had positive rather than disparaging connotations. The positive connotations were associated
with the problem-solving orientation that has long been a central tradition in social work.
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from those that are inherent in the model. Nevertheless, looking at the theoretical
accounts, we find two broad limitations. They involve ways in which the model
is incomplete, though perhaps not irremediably so.
First, POP's commitment to multiple and flexible criteria of success is both
a strength and a weakness. It facilitates more complex responses. However, it
also makes it harder to evaluate success. Since criteria will vary across different
initiatives, rigorous comparisons will be difficult. And since criteria are
provisional, it may be unclear whether a low score reflects the inadequacy of the
intervention or the inadequacy of the metric. This problem can be mitigated by
incorporating some basic standard measures such as crime rates, but moving in
this direction compromises the ambition to contextualize. A common response
in other fields is to adopt modes of evaluation that assess process as well as
outcomes and employ qualitative as well as quantitative judgments. For example,
the "balanced scorecard" used in many fields summarizes both quantitative
measures and qualitative judgments on both process and outcomes. Process
variables in POP would include the quality of problem definition, planning, and
stakeholder engagement. The qualitative judgments typically emerge from a peer
review process in which outsiders with relevant experience audit samples of
cases." 0 Such processes, however, are severely underdeveloped in policing.
Second, there is no clear model of how local problem-solving efforts fit
within the larger structure of policing. Larger structures above the local problem
level have to deal with three sorts of issues. First, they need to collect and analyze
information about local experiences in forms that permit learning. Second, they
need to prioritize problems and allocate resources within the jurisdiction. Third,
they need to coordinate activities across neighborhoods, and indeed across cities,
states, and nations for problems that reach across jurisdictions. POP proponents
have made most progress on the first, learning-facilitation goal. II
In Cincinnati the CIRV reorganization made substantial progress on these
issues for the violence reduction programs. The reorganization involved
sophisticated assessment instruments for both process and outcomes, and it
produced an explicit and comprehensive organizational structure with clearly
assigned responsibility for data gathering and reassessment.11 2 On the other hand,
problem-solving efforts outside of CIRV are less systematically coordinated and
assessed in Cincinnati.

110.
See ROBERT KAPLAN & DAVID NORTON, THE BALANCED SCORECARD:
TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO ACTION (1996). We have described such a review process used in child
protective services in Kathleen G. Noonan et al., LegalAccountability in the Service-Based Welfare State:
Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 523-68 (2009).
A preliminary effort to address both of our problems appears in RACHEL BOBA &
Ill.
ROBERTO SANTOS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., A POLICE
ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL FOR CRIME REDUCTION: INSTITUTIONALIZING PROBLEM SOLVING, ANALYSIS,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2011).
112.
Tillyer et al., supranote 90, at 979-82, 986-89; SECOND YEAR REPORT, supranote
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IV. Civil Rights and Police Reform
Post-bureaucratic organization is distinctively responsive to the difficulties
of second-generation civil rights doctrine. Those difficulties, we have seen,
include applying the notion of intent to disparate harm that results from
inattention and applying the notion of reasonableness to conduct that is
normatively ambiguous. Post-bureaucratic organization responds to these
difficulties by insisting on and facilitating self-consciousness and articulation.
Indeed, much of the literature on post-bureaucratic organization portrays these
qualities, not just as instruments to greater productivity, but as intrinsic values
that constitute a kind of organizational virtue." 3 As applied to contemporary civil
rights cases, they imply a duty to examine rigorously the effects of conduct on
civil rights values and to resolve ambiguity by articulating provisionally but
reflectively the organization's understanding of issues that have not been
resolved externally.
The judicially induced reforms in New York and Cincinnati illustrate the
emerging duty of responsible administration. Their concrete directives owe more
to norms of administrative practice than to any interpretive inferences from
substantive equal protection or search and seizure norms. Yet, the two regimes
reflect a basic difference in remedial design.
The remedial order in New York leaves the city's core policing practices
alone. It adds a set of peripheral compliance routines designed to minimize the
threat of these core practices to civil rights values. The Cincinnati Collaborative
Agreement requires a more comprehensive restructuring. While this holistic
approach is unusual in police litigation, it is part of a larger class of holistic civil
rights reforms in diverse fields. Comprehensive reform sometimes appears more
efficient than specialized compliance procedures from the perspectives of both
civil rights and core crime-control goals.
A. Compliance

Because the city did not settle until the case was on appeal, the New York
lawsuit produced a rare contested judgment. The trial court was thus compelled
to address substantive doctrinal concerns, but its remedial order is generally
consistent with the PTSR approach. As such, it illustrates both the strengths and
weaknesses of that approach.
Whether the plaintiffs established systemic violations under current
doctrine is debatable, and the court's decision would have been vulnerable had

On self-consciousness, see FRED KOFMAN, CONSCIOUS BUSINESS: HOW TO BUILD
113.
VALUE THROUGH VALUES (2012); and on articulation, see PRODUCTIVITY PRESS DEVELOPMENT TEAM,
STANDARD WORK FOR THE SHOPFLOOR 1-12 (2002).
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the appeal gone ahead.1 14 We think the strongest case for the court's decision can
be made in terms of a duty of responsible administration.
The evidence showed extensive administrative neglect or incompetence
with respect to policy-making, supervision, and monitoring of civil rights norms:
the city knew that the document it used for many years to record stops for civil
rights monitoring purposes was inadequate but had made no effort to revise it. It
was aware of long-term and widespread non-compliance with frontline
documentation requirements but failed to address it. It apparently made no use
for monitoring purposes of the records it had been required to keep under an
earlier decree. Its only detailed written policies on racial profiling and the
constitutional limits on search and seizure were in training manuals, and the court
found them erroneous. Although the policies prohibited racial profiling in
general terms, there appeared to be little or no supervisory effort to elaborate or
enforce them. The department used the quantity of stops and arrests that an
officer made as a factor in evaluations, and many officers felt pressure to get
their numbers up without regard to whether the stops were lawful. Although the
department recognized that quotas were inappropriate (and, beginning in 2010,
prohibited by city ordinance), it never produced a coherent written or oral
statement explaining how the quantity of stops figured into evaluation." 5
Within the department, discipline for civil rights violations was rare in part
because the responsible officials, in violation of the department's regulations,
rejected all complaints that depended on uncorroborated civilian testimony
disputed by the officer named in the complaint. Despite numerous claims of
systemic racial bias over more than a decade, including a 1999 New York
Attorney General report, virtually the only rigorous effort to monitor equality
norms was a 2007 RAND Report. That report concluded, on a basis the court
found questionable, that aggregate data did not suggest discrimination. However,
it also concluded that outlier data in particular localities raised questions that

114.
The plaintiffs' case was extensive, but it rested mainly on four points: (1) On
discrimination, the plaintiffs introduced evidence of statements by senior officers as direct evidence of
purposeful discrimination; (2) as indirect evidence, they introduced a sophisticated statistical analysis by
our colleague Jeffrey Fagan showing large disparities between the racial composition of the people
stopped, frisked, and arrested and that of the residents of the neighborhoods in which the police activity
occurred; (3) on search-and-seizure, they introduced testimony about nineteen stops of which the court
found nine to be unlawful; and (4) they also offered a study by Fagan concluding on the basis of an
examination of the department's records that at least 200,000 of 4.2 million stops between 2004 and 2012
were unlawful. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 572-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An appellate

court hewing to the precepts of classicism might have concluded: (1) most of the official statements are
too ambiguous to show purposeful discrimination; (2) the statistical study is strong, but it depends on
complex and disputed methodology of a sort that appellate authority resists in the criminal justice context;
(3) the nine individual instances of Fourth Amendment violations look like the showing that Rizzo held
inadequate; and (4) the search and seizure study is based on sloppily kept, unreliable records. (Of course,
if there is a duty of responsible administration, this latter point is unhelpful to the city. But classical
doctrine sometimes rewards administrative laxness. See supra note 24 and accompanying text).
115.
Floyd,959 F. Supp. 2d at 589-624.
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should be investigated, and the 16department failed to follow up on this or other

recommendations in the report.'

In important respects, the court's remedial order seems more directly
responsive to these administrative failings than to its findings on discriminatory
intent or objective unreasonableness. For the most part, it follows the PTSR
approach of the consent decrees. 1 7 The central remedial intervention is the

appointment of a monitor "to develop, based on consultation with the parties, a
set of reforms of the NYPD's policies, training, supervision, monitoring, and
'
The court laid down some specific
discipline regarding stop and frisk."118

parameters for documentation of stops, and it ordered the department to
"experiment" with using body-worn cameras to videotape stops in at least one
precinct in each of the five boroughs. In addition, the court appointed a second
judicial officer called a "facilitator" to guide a "joint remedial process." '19
The court's order avoids the danger of judicial micro-management, but it
does reflect limitations common to PTSR-style remedial practice. These

limitations reflect the lingering influence of classical doctrinal notions.
With respect to discrimination, we have noted that, under an ambitious
conception of non-discrimination, the defendant has a duty to investigate and
assess the disproportionate costs its practices impose on protected groups and to
consider ways in which these harms might be mitigated. However, in the court's
analysis, both the harms and the practices in question are defined narrowly.
The court is most concerned with the harms to law-abiding minority group
members. It does not treat as justiciable, or at least as remediable, claims arising
from the mass criminalization of young minority men through aggressive minoroffense enforcement, even though this harm is racially skewed and viewed by

116.
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developed in the suits. It did not examine or investigate the facts unless the plaintiffs choose to file separate
administrative complaints. It did not record judicial claims in the personnel files of the officers named in
them. The law department provided almost no information to the police about the claims. These practices
persisted for many years despite recommendations by three city comptrollers that the police department
examine lawsuit claims diagnostically. Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence. The
Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1045-48 (2010). The city
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Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
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many as more serious than harm to the law-abiding. The court does not recognize
a duty on the part of the city to examine the efficacy of stop-and-frisk as a
20
strategy for controlling severe crime or to search for a less harmful alternative.
The court's refusal to take the more ambitious course is consistent with
doctrine that cautions against drawing strong inferences from the disparate
impacts of wholesale choices about which laws to enforce, 21 but it is
nevertheless debatable. What the court sees as a narrower intervention-a
command to eliminate discrimination from the established crime-control
approach-may actually prove quite difficult to enforce once the city has
coached its officers to avoid inculpatory statements and facially inadequate
documentation. A more encompassing intervention might have been easier to
implement. It would not, as the court might have assumed, require a ban of stopand-frisk, much less prescription of an acceptable alternative. Rather, it would
have required the department to expand the self-analysis and stakeholder
deliberations the court ordered to include a disciplined consideration of
alternative crime-control approaches to see if there is a comparably effective but
less harmful way of achieving the city's goals.
With respect to search and seizure, we have noted the problem that, while
Fourth Amendment constitutional duty applies most importantly to the city as an
institution, doctrine and practice tends to be elaborated from the perspective of
the individual police officer at the moment of intervention. A strategy using
massive arrests for minor offenses as a way of gaining leverage over major
offenses and tolerating low hit rates on stops implies relative ignorance about the
community (other than the location of reported crimes). A department that
invests effectively in cultivating useful community relations, in aggregating and
analyzing intelligence, and in facilitating efficient exchange of information
among its members may be able to target its interventions more precisely. New
York City claims that it does these things, but its rigid commitment to stop-andfrisk and its low hit rates raise doubts about the rigor of its efforts.
When it succeeds, POP makes more sparing use of arrests but achieves high
hit rates because it is able to reliably identify the actors most responsible for
community disorder. Many believe that, contrary to the apparent assumptions of
some AP proponents, a very small number of actors are responsible for a large
fraction of disorder even in the most disordered communities.1 22 To the extent
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"1 emphasize at the outset . . . that this case is not about the effectiveness of stop
and frisk in deterring or combating crime."Id. at 556.
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Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 350-51 (2001); Whren v. United
States 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
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For example, in an effort to clean up a severely crime- and drug-ridden
neighborhood in Austin, Texas, intensive intelligence analysis indicated to the surprise of some that there
were only sixteen active dealers. According to one official, "This exercise helped officers realize that they
may have been directing enforcement action toward individuals who lived in and around the drug market
but who were not actually involved in it." Kennedy, supra note 65, at 168. See also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 78, (study of New York City records showing that only 3.1 percent of those arrested
for marijuana possession in 2003 and 2004 were subsequently convicted of a violent felony).
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that this is so, AP is a highly inefficient way of addressing it. Arguably, the
availability of less harmful alternatives should bear on reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment, as it does under some antidiscrimination and tort
doctrines.' 23 Departments using AP should thus have a duty to examine
alternatives, such as POP, and to either adopt one or provide credible reasons for
why it would be less satisfactory than current practices. The court's insistence
that efficacy is not at issue removes pressure from the department to question the
premises of its strategy.
In addition, the New York order, consistent with Whren v. United States,
understands Fourth Amendment reasonableness to depend on the extent to which
evidence supports the officer's judgment that some law (no matter how minor)
has been broken, not on the extent to which intervention furthers underlying
crime-control purposes. Critics object that Whren leaves arbitrariness unchecked.
Defenders of the case warn of the dangers of a standard that turns on the
subjective intentions of individual officers. But from our perspective, the key
focus of inquiry should not be the subjectivity of the individual officer, but the
departmental strategy that the officer's conduct implements. Can the department
show that it has a strategy that explains its officers' practices? Is it assessing the
efficacy of these practices in light of its own experience and those of comparable
agencies? If not, then it is violating its duty of responsible administration.
The limits of classic substantive doctrine explain the limits of the remedial
order, but it is not clear that the authority requires the limits. Remedial practice
has emancipated itself from the constraints of classic substantive doctrine in
many ways. Perhaps it might go further. Cincinnati, to which we return in the
next section, suggests that under some conditions, it could.
B. The HolisticApproach
1. Limits of Specialized Reform

Sometimes the most effective way to vindicate civil rights values is to
change an institution's core practices. Sometimes institutions can be persuaded
or induced to undertake such far-reaching changes because they turn out to be
less costly than peripheral ones.
There are two general reasons why comprehensive reform may prove more
effective. First, compliance procedures added to unreformed core processes may
prove too weak to affect practice or may generate costly friction. Power, honor,
and reward in an organization tend to go to those who excel at attaining core
123.
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goals. Commands that impede the attainment of core goals may be perceived as
illegitimate or hypocritical, and those charged with enforcing them may be seen
as scolds or snitches. Reforms that reduce the tension between core goals and
civil rights norms can reduce such difficulties.
For example, many American producers of consumer products commit to
induce their foreign suppliers to comply with international labor standards. The
track record of these efforts, despite the good faith of most monitors and
substantial investments by many producers, has been poor. Monitors find it hard
to get information on remote, globally-dispersed operations, and they have only
weak influence over the producers' subcontracting decisions. Yet, some
observers see promise in a recent initiative by Nike, the sports apparel producer,
to shift its foreign suppliers' core manufacturing to "lean production."' 124 Lean
production is attractive to global producers because it enables them to respond
more quickly to changes in demand. Going lean requires extensive worker
training, and such an investment tends to make the workers valuable assets. A
rigorous analysis of Nike labor-standard audit records shows that subcontractors
in the program that successfully move to lean production have dramatically better
records than their traditional peers on such important matters as minimum wages,
25
abuse of overtime, and underage labor.1
A second reason why specialized intervention may fail is that poor respect
for civil rights may be a symptom of broader organizational dysfunction. Lani
Guinier and Gerald Torres suggest that evidence of civil rights violations is often
a kind of "miner's canary" that signals more pervasive pathology.' 26 Efforts to
reform a discrete piece of a generally failing organization may be thwarted by
surrounding dysfunction. In such situations, it may turn out that comprehensive
change can serve other institutional goals as well as civil rights.
Efforts to address race discrimination in juvenile justice provide an
illustration. Minority youth are overrepresented at every stage of the criminal
justice process, especially incarceration. Amendments in 1992 and 2002 to the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act mandate that juvenile justice
officials proactively address "disproportionate minority contacts."'' 2 7 They must
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assessment of school desegregation, which argues that the more successful efforts tended to involve
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measure and report on racial incidence, develop plans to mitigate
disproportionate effects, and periodically reassess these plans. The Department
of Justice and the Annie E. Casey Foundation have developed a national structure
that provides technical
assistance and facilitates peer exchanges among state and
28
local governments.
The dominant strategy that has emerged among the participants in the Casey
Foundation network is a reform of the entire detention process. A key element
involves the replacement of informal probation-officer judgments at the entry
stage with a risk assessment instrument that dictates decisions on the basis of
numerical scores for key variables. The instruments are constructed through
statistical analysis of past experience to determine which indicators predict
reoffense or failure to appear at a hearing. Scores can be overridden, but only
with supervisory approval, and the overrides are periodically reviewed to see if
they indicate a need for changes in the instrument.
The reforms have been associated with large reductions in the percentage
of youth of all races detained.2 9 Although aggregate racial disparities have not
changed much, there have been notable local reductions, and youth of color have
benefitted greatly from the aggregate detention reductions. So far, the story
seems a striking example of the "miner's canary" idea that racial disparities can
signal a more general problem. For our purposes, the key point is that the
reformers plausibly concluded that the most effective way to vindicate civil
rights was to reform the institution's core processes, rather than to add a
130
specialized compliance function.

2. Problem-Oriented Policing as a Civil Rights Remedy.
Many police regimes that have been subject to structural challenges involve
one or both of the conditions that favor holistic intervention. Their crime control
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strategies depend on street confrontations based on overbroad and racially
inflected criteria. These strategies are constitutionally problematic even where
they are effective, 3 ' and officers tend to believe they are effective more than
they are. Thus, specialized civil rights remediation is likely to generate friction
by inhibiting what officers consider to be their core functions. Moreover, the
insufficient attention to civil rights values in these regimes is often symptomatic
of more general administrative underdevelopment and dysfunction.
Cincinnati illustrates the possibility of litigation-induced holistic reform.
The city entered into two agreements to reform its police department in 2002.
One was with the Department of Justice, which initiated an investigation at the
invitation of the mayor in the aftermath of civil unrest over a fatal police shooting
of an unarmed man. The other was a "Collaborative Agreement" settling a
lawsuit alleging racially biased policing brought by the American Civil Liberties
Union, a local advocacy group called the Black United Front, and some
individuals. 132
The Department of Justice agreement and part of the Collaborative
Agreement focused on familiar PTSR measures. Yet the most extensive
provisions of the Collaborative Agreement prescribed uniquely ambitious
reform. "The City," the decree proclaimed, "shall adopt problem-oriented
33
policing as the principal strategy for addressing crime and disorder problems."1
A prefatory "Value Statement" asserts that POP "frames the overall
philosophy and practices" of the Agreement. More specifically, the city agrees
that "[i]nitiatives to resolve crime and disorder shall be preceded by careful
problem, definition, analysis, and an examination of a broad range of solutions."
Further, the police must "routinely evaluate implemented solutions." The
Agreement adds, "A law enforcement response is always a possibility, but may
not be required." The Agreement recites that every Cincinnati officer will receive
at least eight hours of training in the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response,
34
Assessment) methodology.1
It further sets out administrative procedures designed to create a
"'continuous learning' process." The city will develop a "system... [to] enable
the tracking of repeat offenders, repeat victims, and/or repeat locations that are
necessary to community problem oriented policing." The system must enable the
"tracking" of problems so that progress can be ascertained and so that officers
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can identify interventions that may have useful lessons for related or similar
problems. The city committed to examine
practices in other jurisdictions and
135
maintain a "library of best practices."
The city also committed to develop "ongoing community dialog and
interaction." In addition to the complaint and monitoring processes, the
agreement provided for "periodic surveys" of samples of both citizens and police
officers on their views of police-citizen relations.' 36
The Agreement implicitly rejects the premise of substantive Fourth
Amendment doctrine that probable cause for a stop or arrest establishes its
reasonableness. The SARA process assesses reasonableness in terms of the
broader problem-solving plan that the action implements. At the same time, the
Agreement is emphatic in rejecting intent as a touchstone. A "[c]entral" premise
is that "blame is an obstacle to progress." Blaming, the document asserts,
distracts attention from the common interests different groups share and from the
search for mutually beneficial practices.1 37 The implication is that the racially
disproportionate harm from the city's policing practices results, not from intent,
but from indifference or ignorance, and that the appropriate remedy is to realign
attention, not incentives, and to induce learning.
The Collaborative Agreement has run its term (initially five years, extended
to six), but as we have seen, it continues to influence practice in Cincinnati, albeit
incompletely. Some citizens and officers continue to refer to "the Collaborative"
as an ongoing institution.
The embrace of POP as a civil rights remedy is partly due to some historical
accidents.' 38 However, the appeal of POP as a civil rights remedy rests on
broader considerations. POP potentially facilitates better-informed and more
nuanced decisions that affect civil rights values. In particular, it has the potential
to reduce the need for imprecisely targeted coercive interventions that threaten
both Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection values. With respect to
discrimination, POP encourages a more continuous and localized assessment of
disproportionate harm to protected groups and a search for less harmful
alternatives. With respect to search and seizure, it potentially facilitates more
focused strategies for controlling serious crimes that rely less on vague and
overbroad criteria for intervention. POP respects the injunction of Terry v.

135.
Id. at
29c, 29p, 29b. Observation on our visit in January 2014 suggested that
implementation of these provisions had fallen off.
136.
Id. at 29f, 34.
137.
ld.at 2.
138.
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the other and to seek solutions that involved mutual engagement. See Eck & Rothman, supra note 90. In
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Ohio1 39 that police confrontation be based on reasonable, "individualized"

suspicion. It intervenes more selectively and with a richer information base than
AP. In addition, it strives for the kind of accountability that the Whren court
considered infeasible. It asks offices to justify their decisions, not just in terms
of whether some law has been broken in a particular situation, but in terms of a
broader crime-control strategy.
At the same time, POP extends the transparency and reasonableexplanation themes of the duty of responsible administration. It provides
explanations of police conduct that are accessible to the local community. As it
enables the police to profit from stakeholder knowledge, it enables stakeholders
to better assess conduct both for general efficacy and for compliance with civil
rights norms. It encourages citizen involvement, not just as sources of
information, but as active participants who have something to contribute to the
efficacy of the strategy.
We do not suggest that Cincinnati's approach is constitutionally mandatory.
Even if relevant doctrine is understood to entail disciplined analysis of harms
and alternatives, there may be many ways of institutionalizing these practices
effectively. It is possible that a more centralized and standardized regime might
do so. But POP seems more directly responsive to the challenges of the emerging
duty of responsible administration than any version of AP established to date. 40
V. Conclusion
Second-generation civil rights problems resist substantive regulation. Thus,
doctrine has focused increasingly on the structures and practices that give content
to official discretion. At its most effective, intervention has encouraged postbureaucratic trends that minimize the unreflectiveness and ambiguity that give
rise to second-generation problems.
Yet, as developments in policing show with particular clarity, postbureaucratic organization takes markedly different forms with correspondingly
different implications for accountability. At one extreme, exemplified by AP in
New York, the organization focuses on identifying high-crime locales and
rapidly mobilizing a limited set of conventional interventions within them. It
decentralizes only to the extent necessary to speed redeployment of forces. At
the other extreme, exemplified by POP as practiced in Cincinnati, the
organization aims to make its interventions at once more effective and more
139.
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precisely targeted by tailoring interventions to particular contexts-specifically,
physical environments or social networks. To acquire the necessary information,
initiative is decentralized to the lower ranks, and the department collaborates
with the community at many levels.
These differences in strategy matter for accountability. The strategies shape
the nature and determine the frequency of the situations under which police may
put constitutional values most sharply at risk. Strategies such as POP that strive
to distinguish wrongdoers from others in the neighborhood, to concentrate on
precisely identified criminogenic locations, and to enlist community support are
less likely to produce constitutionally risky confrontations than are strategies like
AP.
The Constitution does not mandate POP, and it would be fruitless to impose
it on a department that is hostile to it. It is possible that a more centralized and
standardized regime might achieve equivalent or better performance. The role of
the court or the supervisory agency like the DOJ under a duty of responsible
administration is not to prescribe solutions. Rather, it is to induce entities that
have violated constitutional norms to undertake disciplined self-analysis of the
extent and underlying causes of the harms they have inflicted and a painstaking
search for less burdensome alternatives.
Although the Cincinnati reforms are unusual in their comprehensiveness,
core elements of ongoing, transparent self-assessment are entering best-practice
conventions. The DOJ's "Principles for Promoting Police Integrity"--a starting
point for remedial design in many interventions-demand an open-ended inquiry
into the underlying causes of impermissible behavior by prescribing that the
"precipitating events" that lead to use-of-force, searches and seizures, and other
such actions should be reviewed to determine "whether any revisions to training
or practices are necessary."' 41 The Early Intervention systems, which operate in
accordance with the SARA principles at the core of POP, have enlarged their
focus from (groups of) at risk officers to breakdowns in supervision that tolerate
or encourage misconduct. From there it is a manageable step to consideration of
the strategies that shape the tasks and incentives of supervisors. Cincinnati gives
an imperfect but suggestive illustration of what it would mean to apply such
assessment, not just in reaction to instances of malfeasance, but proactively to
the agency's core crime-control strategies.
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